British Journal ofsocial Psychology zyxwvutsrq (1997), 36, 139-159 zyxwv 0 1997 The British Psychological Society zyxwvu SP0535 Printed in Great Britain 139 z The dialogic unconscious: Psychoanalysis, discursive psychology and the nature of repression Michael Billig” Department zyxwvutsr of Sorial Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire LEI 1 3TU, UK This paper explores possible links between discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory. At first sight, the two approaches would seem to be incompatible. Discursive psychology, in keeping with its Wittgensteinian and conversation analytic background, concentrates upon the social and discursive constitution of psychological phenomena rather than on supposed inner motivations. However, the notion of the ‘dialogic uncon- scious’ is introduced in order to suggest how processes of repression can be studied dis- cursively. The argument for the dialogic unconscious suggests that conversational interaction can have repressive functions, as well as expressive ones. It is suggested that discursive psychology has tended to overlook this repressive dimension, concentrating upon the presences rather than absences in discourse. However, the conversational devices, which conversation analysts have revealed to be vital for politeness and every- day morality, can also be seen to repress the temptation of rudeness. That being so, repression can be observed to be routinely accomplished by discursive interaction. Moreover, the notion of the dialogic unconscious not only suggests that dialogue can be repressive, but also that repression is itself a dialogic, or discursive, process. The impli- cations for both discursive psychology and Freudian psychoanalytic theory are discussed. This paper will discuss the possibility of making links between discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory. At first sight, these two ways of understanding psychological phe- nomena seem utterly incompatible. Discursive psychology, which is being developed as a challenge to orthodox social psychology, discourages speculation about ‘inner’ processes (e.g. Antaki, 1994; Billig, 1 9 9 7 ~ ; Edwards, 1991, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993; Had, 1995; Hard & Gillett, 1994; Parker, 1992; Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 1995). Discursive psychology takes inspiration from the philosophical tradition of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and from the development of ethnomethodology and con- versation analysis. These traditions of analysis stress the need to examine in detail the out- ward accomplishment of social life, showing how social order is reproduced through discursive interaction. Discursive psychology applies this project to psychological phe- nomena. It argues that phenomena, which traditional psychological theories have treated as ‘inner processes’, are, in fact, constituted through social, discursive activity. * Requests for reprints.