P1: KDD/KAA P2: IRK/JZZ 0521832543agg.xml CY406B/Forgas 0 521 82354 3 May 6, 2004 14:34 8 From Evolved Motives to Everyday Mentation Evolution, Goals, and Cognition Steven L. Neuberg, Douglas T. Kenrick, Jon K. Maner, and Mark Schaller introduction Walking across a crowding shopping mall, you may see a group of people who vary in their race, gender, attractiveness, clothing style, and demeanor. A similarly complex array of social stimuli confronts us at conferences, air- ports, farmer’s markets, and college campuses. Rarely do we attend equally to all individuals in such complex social environments or to all character- istics of any given individual. Rather, we selectively direct our attention toward a smaller subset of individuals and characteristics. This selective direction of attention often occurs automatically, without conscious in- tent, and can have important consequences for subsequent thoughts and actions. Who do we attend to, think about, and later remember? And how are the answers to this question linked to our goals at the moment? We re- cently embarked on a program of research to explore the processes that influence the selective and automatic direction of perceptual and cognitive resources. In this chapter, we present a conceptual framework that begins to articulate the role that fundamental social goals play in governing these processes. We focus, in particular, on the ways in which self-protection and mating goals selectively facilitate attention toward people who have characteristics relevant to those goals. Integrating theory and research on selective attention processes, the influence of goals on social cognition and behavior, and ecological theories of motivation and social cognition, our Work on this chapter was supported by a grant from the U.S. National Institute of Men- tal Health to the first, second, and fourth authors. The ideas described here have bene- fited greatly from conversations with Vaughn Becker, Andy Delton, Brian Hofer, Jon Butner, and Chris Wilbur, and we thank Bill von Hippel for his helpful comments on a previous draft of this chapter. Correspondence can be directed to Steven L. Neuberg or Douglas T. Kenrick, Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104; e-mail: steven.neuberg@asu.edu or douglas.kenrick@asu.edu. 133