77 Bulgarian Mass Privatisation Scheme. Implications on Corporate Governance Plamen Tchipev*1 Introduction Bulgaria as many other CEE countries developed a Mass Privatisation Scheme (MPS). The Scheme is based upon specific financial intermediaries called Privatisation Funds (PFs). Beside the important functions they have to play in the mechanics of the process - collection and exchange of vouchers against the acquired assets from the privatised companies, those institutions are expected to perform another, even more important role - to establish an effective system for corporate governance over the privatised companies. The main questions associated with the implementation of MPS emerge at that point - is it justifiable to expect those institutions capable and willing to exert control and monitoring over the enterprises they hold stakes in, if they do not normally perform that function in the developed market economies. Could one hope that given the specifics in transforming economies those institutions would change their behaviour and what kind this change would be? Is it possible to guide the institutions' activity in a targeted direction by a special regulation and what type it should be? Those kinds of problems are familiar to the researchers dealing with the problems of transforming economies and particularly, with the problems of Central and Eastern Europe privatisation. Carlin and Mayer (1992), Coffee Jr. (1994), A. Thorn, Stiglitz (1991), van Vijnbergen (1992), Frydman et al. (1993) point out them and propose solutions, emphasising mostly the temporary and auxiliary role of privatisation intermediaries and recommending orientation of the financial systems toward a more traditional models for corporate control. Recognising the vast complexity of the problem, the following study presents extensively the Bulgarian Mass Privatisation Scheme with its relevant legal framework and some of its first results concerning exclusively the Privatisation Funds, their organisation, objectives, resulting portfolios and interaction with the government and the stock market. First section presents the overall process. Second part deals with the legal regulations of PFs and the third section reveals some of the first results. Section 4 offers the conclusions. *1 Institute of Economics; Bulgarian Academy of Sciences