SVEN OVE HANSSON and ERIK J. OLSSON PROVIDING FOUNDATIONS FOR COHERENTISM ABSTRACT. We prove that four theses commonly associated with coherentism are in- compatible with the representation of a belief state as a logically closed set of sentences. The result is applied to the conventional coherence interpretation of the AGM theory of belief revision, which appears not to be tenable. Our argument also counts against the coherentistic acceptability of a certain form of propositional holism. We argue that the problems arise as an effect of ignoring the distinction between derived and non-derived beliefs, and we suggest that the kind of coherence relevant to epistemic justification is the coherence of non-derived beliefs. 1. INTRODUCTION According to foundationalism, the justification of a belief must ultimately rely on some belief(s) the justification of which is immediate. The justific- ation of a belief is immediate if that belief is either self-justifying or can be founded on something outside the belief state (an observation, a sense- datum, an act of intuition, et cetera). Beliefs with immediate justifications (“basic beliefs”) provide the source of justification for other beliefs. A belief is justified if and only if it can be justified relative to some basic belief(s). Coherentists, on the other hand, claim that justification is never im- mediate. There are no self-evident beliefs that provide us with their own justification. (At least this is held to be true for beliefs in contingent propositions. Many coherentists delimit themselves to trying to give an account of knowledge of empirical facts.) Purported examples of self- evident beliefs have proved not to be so self-evident after all. 2 In order to be justified in believing, for instance, that one sees a red spot one must rely on other beliefs, e.g., beliefs about what red looks like, what a spot is, and so on. According to the coherentist we cannot go beyond our beliefs when justifying a given belief. The justifications of a belief are always to be found within the sphere of beliefs. 3 The discussion between foundationalists and coherentists focuses on the conditions under which beliefs are justified. The problem of represent- ation of belief or knowledge, on the other hand, is a prima facie different Erkenntnis 51: 243–265, 1999. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.