Volume 4 • Issue 2 • 1000121 J Def Manag ISSN: 2167-0374 JDFM, an open access journal Research Article Open Access Dwivedy and Acharya, J Def Manag 2014, 4:2 DOI: 10.4172/2167-0374.1000121 Opinion Open Access As on date, a coalition of 50 plus countries has put forth a common front against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In many respects, this coalition is more wide-ranging and intrusive than the one which evolved following the September 11, 2001 (9/11 attacks) in the US. Ultimately, the combined frepower of the coalition could be rather overwhelming for ISIS. Besides, the fact that a number of Arab countries are directly contributing to the military strikes, the move against the ISIS has been projected to be more legitimate from the perspective of the Muslim world. But the question is would defeating ISIS militarily mean the end of jihadism? From ISI to ISIS or ISIL In itself, ISIS’s claim of the establishment of an Islamic state is not as signifcant as the consideration of the issues that make such misadventures feasible and attractive to those that have joined or empathize with the group in the frst place. In fact, understanding the metamorphosis of the fedging Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) that came into existence in 2006 to the ISIS or ISIL, or from being described as a “jayvee team” to be one of severe strategic or existential concern from a counterterrorism perspective, is extremely signifcant. Te 2006 declaration, claiming the establishment of the ISI, was the outcome of the US invasion, and the perception of occupation, of Iraq, which essentially dispossessed the ruling Sunni elite under Saddam Hussain’s rule. Te establishment of a Shi’a-led government and the rising prominence of the Kurds were further bitter pills to shallow as evident from the frst statement of ISI in which it emphasized that this initiative was in response to the division of the country among the Shi’as and the Kurds. At the time however, the group had rather limited objectives–to establish its control over a Sunni dominated area encompassing “Baghdad, Al Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahudin, Ninawa, and of parts of the provinces of Babel and Al Wassat,” in Iraq. How then the group could manage to expand itself - possessing territory both in Iraq and Syria; recruiting cadres from all over the world; and amassing assets to fnance and sustain its ambitious caliphate project? Te Arab Spring Fall-out ISIS’s gathering of strength could partly be due to the Arab Spring fall-out which, as Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri emphasized, provided opportunities to undertake jihadist state-building initiatives across the region. Groups, which were mostly marginalized, were able to revive as the governments and their security and intelligence apparatus remained preoccupied with the protests. Erosion of state power and instability of the new regimes and the emergence of territories in many countries of the region, which respective governments could no longer control, created spaces for disparate jihadists to regroup, reorganize and train and new ones to emerge. Prolonged instability, unmet promises of reform and economic woes exacerbated public frustration and increased the vulnerability for radicalization which the jihadists exploited. ISIS’s strength also stems from its ability to harness the media, especially the social media with which it “created a brand, spread a seductive narrative and employed powerful iconography,” thereby efectively becoming a magnet for foreign fghters including those from North America and Europe. Money: Back in the Business of Terrorism? Arguably, all these activities, including payments to the recruits, involve money–a lot of money. In fact, the ISIS phenomenon has brought the importance of money in terrorism to focus once again. It has been repeatedly emphasized how to progress from fringe radicals to recognized terrorists, the groups must have to acquire some income frst and foremost. Most assessments of ISIS’s rise and strength point to the huge amount of money that the group could amass from multiple sources including the looting of $400 million in cash from an Iraqi bank; oil revenue from captured oilfelds and donations. Te group also appropriated the military hardware especially those given to the Iraqi army by the US. In a way, it is not the possession of territory per se, but the wealth – estimated to be between 800 million and one billion a year, which could explain the group’s ability to put up a threat of massive proportions. In relative terms, money could even be more important than the control of territory. In fact, post-9/11, territorial possession or mere presence in an identifable physical location have proven to be serious vulnerabilities for most groups as evident from the fate of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Conversely, depriving the group access to its resources would be one of the most important tools to degrade and destroy it eventually. ISIS has been in a constant fght and mobilization to stay in the areas it controlled, the challenge of which would grow over time. Tis no doubt would be a huge cost to the group involving money and other resources, besides eroding its opportunity in terms of establishing governing structures necessary for statehood. Failure to demonstrate the attributes of a functioning state would undermine the vital aspects of its message that has been attracting recruits for the group from around the world and put a dent on its ambitious caliphate project. It’s not all about Military Strikes only It is in the above contexts that the fght against ISIS needs to be *Corresponding author: Dharitri Dwivedy, Madras University, India, Tel: (91) 9437411839; E-mail: dharitree@gmail.com Received September 30, 2014; Accepted October 01, 2014; Published October 06, 2014 Citation: Dwivedy D, Acharya A (2014) Fighting ISIS: Priming for a Multi-pronged Engagement? J Def Manag 4: 121. doi:10.4172/2167-0374.1000121 Copyright: © 2014 Dwivedy D, et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Fighting ISIS: Priming for a Multi-pronged Engagement? Dharitri Dwivedy* and Arabinda Acharya Madras University, India Journal of Defense Management J o u r n a l o f D e f e n s e M a n a g e m e n t ISSN: 2167-0374