1 Georg Simmel on Historical Understanding Martin Kusch §1. Introduction Since the early nineteenth century, "understanding" (Verstehen) has been a central category in philosophical debates over the aims and methods of the sciences and the arts, over methodological differences between fields of study, and even over the human condition in general. The term first gained prominence in the German- speaking lands where historians like Johann Gustav Droysen, philosophers like Wilhelm Dilthey, or social theorists like Max Weber, used it to demarcate history from philosophy, the humanities from the natural sciences, or the right from the wrong approaches in history, economics, and sociology. In this paper, I shall analyse a contribution, of the same time and context, that has only rarely received detailed scholarly attention: Georg Simmel's theory of historical understanding. Simmel’s account was closely related to Droysen's, Dilthey's, and Weber's ideas; he critically responded to Droysen or Dilthey, and Weber reacted with both admiration and hostility to Simmel's suggestions. At the same time, Simmel’s proposal was bold, original, and provocative. In what follows, I shall reconstruct Simmel's reflections on understanding as he developed them from the 1890s until his death in 1918. Limitations of space do not, however, allow me to detail the various stages in the development of Simmel’s position. 1 I shall try to make plausible the following theses. First, Simmel's theory of understanding was not initially part of a systematic attempt to demarcate the natural sciences from the social sciences or the humanities. Only from around 1905 onward, did Simmel fall in line the neo-Kantian demarcation efforts. Second, Simmel criticized some ingredients and forms of the "re-enactment" (Nachbilden) theory of understanding. Third, Simmel's theory was anti-realist in its likening the