1 The Sociology of Philosophical Canons: The Case of Georg Simmel Martin Kusch (University of Vienna) Introduction Sociological methods and theories feature only rarely in work on the history of philosophy. One reason for this rarity is that few philosophers are interested in the formation, preservation, or dissolution of philosophical canons. By definition, a canon is an enduring collective achievement, the result of debate, controversy and negotiation. Or, to use the language of “social ontology” (Barnes 1988, Searle 1995), “canon” is a “social status”: certain pieces of metal are our money because we collectively take them to be money; likewise, a set of authors constitutes our canon because we collectively take these authors to constitute our canon. To establish a canon, philosophers need to convince their colleagues to value some authors more than others. Typically, the criteria, standards and values invoked in such sorting and ranking are not widely accepted beforehand; and neither do they determine a unique outcome. After all, at the heart of the formation of a canon lie decisions over what kind of work is important; what texts and authors should be central in the training of the next generation; or which past achievements should be the starting points of contemporary work. Clearly, importance is not a hard and fast criterion, and a wide variety of factors determine the extension of importance for a given individual or community. In this paper, I shall offer a case study in the “sociology of philosophical canons”. I shall try to explain why one particular author, the German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1918), did not make it into the philosophical canon of his time and place. In other words, I shall try to analyse canon-formation via negationis: I shall attempt to identify the reasons and causes which lead to Simmel’s exclusion from the canon. My hope is that this will help us to understand the kinds of intellectual, social and political elements that result in philosophical canons.