1 SCOTUS ON UNIVERSALS John Hawthorne Suppose one believes that the humanity of Socrates exists. One will then usually go on to affirm one of the following two theses. First, one might claim that the humanity of Socrates is distinct from the humanity of Plato. Following contemporary nomenclature, we can call the natural generalization of this thesis the trope theory for humanity: for every human there exists the humanity of that human which is not the humanity of any other human. Alternatively, one might claim that the humanity of Socrates is identical to the humanity of Plato. This is the universals theory of humanity: there is one thing— humanity—that is possessed both by Plato and Socrates and indeed every other human. If one opts for a trope theory, one has the burden of explaining what the humanities have in common; if one opts for a universals theory, one has the burden of explaining away the conceptual oddity of a single thing being fully present in many places. So each view has its puzzles. But what seems pretty clear is that if the humanity of Socrates exists, then either tropes or universals exist (and perhaps both). Intriguingly, Duns Scotus appears upon first reading to offer a different view than either of these concerning the metaphysical status of the humanity of Socrates. The trope and universals views both claim that the humanity of Socrates stands in relations of numerical identity and difference to other natures. On the trope view, the humanity of Socrates is numerically distinct both from the humanity of Plato and from the angelhood of Gabriel. On the universals view, the humanity of Socrates is numerically identical to the humanity of Plato but numerically distinct from the angelhood of Gabriel. According to Scotus, however, the humanity of Socrates has “less than a numerical unity”—which