© 2020 |Published by Scholars Middle East Publishers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates 76 Scholars Bulletin Abbreviated Key Title: Sch Bull ISSN 2412-9771 (Print) |ISSN 2412-897X (Online) Scholars Middle East Publishers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Journal homepage: https://saudijournals.com/sb Subject Category: Economics Influence of Manager Ownership, Manager Quality and Conservatism on Earnings Quality: Evidence from Indonesian Banking Sector Fazril Azi Nugraha * , Erna Setiany Universitas Mercubuana Jakarta, Indonesia DOI: 10.36348/sb.2020.v06i03.004 | Received: 19.03.2020 | Accepted: 26.03.2020 | Published: 30.03.2020 *Corresponding author: Fazril Azi Nugraha Abstract This study aims to look at the effect of manager ownership, manager quality, and conservatism on earnings quality in banking companies in Indonesia. The population used in this study is banking companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. The sample used was 41 banking companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2013-2018. Purposive sampling is used in this study, based on sampling criteria, the number of observations was 218 unit of analysis. The results of the study found that manager ownership has a positive and significant effect on the quality of accrual earnings in companies in the banking sector, while manager quality and conservatism do not have a significant effect on quality accrual earnings in a sample of banking sector companies in Indonesia. Keywords: Banking Sector, Conservatism, Discretionary Accrual, Earning Quality, Free Cash Flow, Leverage, Managerial Ownership, Manager Quality, Sales Growth. Copyright @ 2020: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial use (NonCommercial, or CC-BY-NC) provided the original author and source are credited. INTRODUCTION The management makes financial statements as a tool to provide financial information to stakeholders including government, investors, creditors, and other parties. The financial statement information is carried out to meet the information needs of internal and external stakeholders as the responsibility of management. So that the report becomes a compulsory source of information to be published and is a means of management accountability towards the management of the resources owned by investors and creditors. According to Scott [1] Agency theory is a branch of game theory to understand and learn how to design contracts in order to motivate the minds of agents to act in accordance with the wishes of the principal when there is a conflict of interest between the agent and the principal. Many studies that try to explain the relationship between owners and managers and also distrust of the performance of managers as representatives of the owner are called agency problems in agency theory. For one thing, management often has great economic motivation to increase added value for itself for two reasons. First, compensation for management is related to financial performance. Then the second, incentives related to job prospects (position). Good performance in companies tends to get promotions. Managers who can achieve the objectives of the shareholders will get a better offer opportunity on the job market ie high salaries [2]. To get these incentives, one of them is through earnings management. Agency theory is important to explain the phenomenon that occurs in managers in reporting corporate earnings or earnings management, causing differences in the quality of earnings generated in the report due to operational cycles and decision making by managers. In this case, corporate governance is one solution to reduce conflicts of interest. According to Bloomfield [2], corporate governance becomes a system to direct or control a company by determining rights and responsibilities between the board, managers, shareholders. Then outline the rules and procedures for making decisions in the company. So that governance can be a mechanism to resolve conflicts of interest. Wherewith the governance can improve the quality of earnings by ensuring that reported income is not made up for a specific purpose. Previous research on earnings management in banks in Indonesia was carried out by Muid [3] and Abbas [4] with accrual discretion used to calculate earnings management carried out in banks in Indonesia. While Faradilla [5] examines Islamic banking in