Global Political Review (GPR) Vol. III, No. I (Spring 2018) | Pages: 94 – 100 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2018(III-I).10 DOI: 10.31703/gpr.2018(III-I).10 China’s Growing Strategic Interests in Afghanistan Huma Qayum * Syed Umair Jalal † Uroosa Ishfaq ‡ • p- ISSN: 2520-0348 • e-ISSN: 2707-4587 • ISSN-L: 2520-0348 China is giving a push to the reconciliation process among the Taliban and the Afghan government. As well as working on trilateral relations of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. China is looking for CPEC expansion to Afghanistan through Pakistan, for which China seeks to explore the ways of reconciliation in Afghanistan among the Taliban and the Afghan government. US wants his long stay in Afghanistan to check the regional power of China and Russia, while China is taking interest in the Afghan peace process to smooth the way for US complete withdrawal. China along with other regional powers in Afghanistan supporting the Taliban demand of the US comprehensive drawdown timeline. The paper will bring into light China’s role in Afghan peace and reconciliation, especially with the Taliban. It will also analyze China’s role in Afghanistan's infrastructure and development. Headings • Key Words • Introduction • China’s Role in Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation • Relations under Hamid Karzai Era • National Unity Government and China-Afghanistan Bilateral Relations • China’s Relationship with the Afghan Taliban • Conclusion • References Key Words: China, Afghanistan, Strategic interests, reconstruction and reconciliation, Belt and Road Initiative. Introduction Historically and politically Afghanistan and China never hostile towards each other, and when China got independence in 1949, Afghanistan wholeheartedly supported the reorganization of newly created People’s Democratic Republic of China. The monarchy of Afghanistan recognized the first communist government of Mao Zedong in China during the 1950s and after five years established diplomatic relations among the two states. However, very insignificant progress can see in both states until 2001. China never wants to indulge in Afghan politics after 9/11 US attacks. Nor China provided any kind of support to the Taliban militants. But during all such scenarios, China was completely neutral. It was after 2001 when the interim setup under Karzai was formed and similarly, China fully supported the Karzai government after the 2004 Presidential elections (Pandey, 2017). China and Afghanistan shared a slight border of about 76 kilometers along the water divide along the Agsu river trajectory with the Amu Darya in the West, and the Kara chukar river in the East belongs to the Yarkand River. It started in a tripoint from the Gilgit-Baltistan side and ended with Tajikistan. On China's side, the border is in the Chalachigu Valley. While from the Afghanistan side it ends with the Wakhan corridor and crossed by Wakhjir pass. There are natural reserves on both sides of the border. In the late 19 century British in the Indian Sub-continent were reluctant from the Russian encroachment policy in Central Asia, Sinkiang and Tibet. The British obtained a buffer zone among Russian and India by the extension of Afghan sovereignty over the narrow Wakhan corridor. This east-west corridor efficiently aided to mark Russian and British imperialist strategies. The Wakhan corridor was eventually demarcated with an eastern limit of Afghan sovereignty. But in maps, it was not clear with China. In 20 th * PhD Scholar, Department of Political Science and International Relations at International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan. Email: humamdn@gmail.com † MPhil Scholar, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, KP, Pakistan. ‡ MPhil Scholar, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, KP, Pakistan. Abstract