Journal of Personality Assessment, 93(1), 96–104, 2011 Copyright C  Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0022-3891 print / 1532-7752 online DOI: 10.1080/00223891.2010.528483 The FAD–Plus: Measuring Lay Beliefs Regarding Free Will and Related Constructs DELROY L. P AULHUS AND J ASMINE M. CAREY Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia We describe the development of FAD–Plus, a 27-item measure of lay beliefs in free will and 3 closely related constructs: scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability. Previously published measures included only a subset of these variables and tended to assume an a priori pattern of relations among these 4 beliefs. In Study 1, exploratory factor analyses suggested relatively independent factors. This independence was sustained in Study 2, using a confirmatory analysis. Each of the 4 subscales (Free Will, Scientific Determinism, Fatalistic Determinism, and Unpredictability) showed acceptable internal consistencies. Study 2 also mapped out associations with the Big Five personality traits and showed that believing in free will is not synonymous with having an internal locus of control. Study 3 replicated the instrument’s structure and subscale reliabilities in a community sample. Preliminary applications are described. The venerable debate over free will and determinism has in- spired a new wave of theoretical commentary (e.g., Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008) as well as empirical research (e.g., Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Nichols, 2006; Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Wegner, 2002). Interest in lay percep- tions of these worldview issues has heightened the need for an effective measure of beliefs in free will and such related concepts as determinism and unpredictability. Unfortunately, the extant measures have (at least) one of two deficits: (a) they tap only a subset of the variables, or (b) they rely on a priori assumptions regarding relations among these beliefs—for example, that free will and determinism are incompatible. In a seminal effort, Viney, Waldman, and Barchilon (1982) developed a scale based directly on the philosophical debate over free will versus determinism. Unfortunately, administration of the instrument required a preparatory lecture, implying that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive: Indeed, all seven items in the scale assumed bipolarity. Even with the preparatory lecture, typical college students had difficulty understanding the items. Such concerns led Nichols (2006) to discourage use of the Viney instrument. To better capture the complexity of the association between free will and determinism, Stroessner and Green (1990) in- cluded multiple facets in their scale. Attitudes toward free will were measured separately from two forms of determinism: psy- chosocial and religious-philosophical. The subscales were de- rived from orthogonal factors and totaled separately. Because the correlations among the subscales were not provided, it is not clear what the final associations among the three scales were. Two other measures have recently appeared in the literature. Rather than targeting free will directly, Keller (2005) devel- oped an 18-item measure of genetic determinism. He found that high scores were associated with a variety of unsavory hu- man qualities. Another questionnaire measure was developed by Rakos, Laurene, Skala, and Slane (2008). It returns to the Received July 6, 2009; Revised June 21, 2010. Address correspondence to Delroy L. Paulhus, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z4, Canada; Email: dpaulhus@psych.ubc.ca earlier conception of free will and determinism as opposites, thereby reconfounding the concepts teased apart by Stroessner and Green (1990). APRELIMINARY VERSION The combination of a burgeoning interest in the topic and the inadequacy of extant measures motivated us to develop a multi-factor instrument. A preliminary but unpublished version (the FAD–4) has been available for a number of years (Paulhus & Margesson, 1994). It included seven Likert-style items per subscale. Analyses on that instrument suggested that free will items cluster separately from two distinct types of determinism, namely, scientific and fatalistic. Also distinct were items tapping unpredictability. Separate measurement of those four constructs included confirmation of Stroessner and Green’s (1990) finding that beliefs in free will and determinism are not incompatible. Although never published, the FAD–4 proved useful in a number of published studies. Westlake and Paulhus (2007), for example, showed that Free Will scores were positively associated with punitiveness toward lawbreakers. Vohs and Schooler (2008) showed that the Free Will subscale was negatively associated with willingness to cheat for financial gain. Baumeister et al. (2009) demonstrated that Free Will scores were able to predict a behavioral indicator of altru- ism. More details about research on the FAD–4 are available at www.psych.ubc.ca/∼dpaulhus/FAD info. THE PRESENT RESEARCH Despite some recent success, the FAD–4 had psychometric weaknesses. As a result, it was never published. Subscale relia- bilities sometimes slipped below .60 and several items exhibited double loadings and even cross-loadings. Although the subscale intercorrelations were modest, we suspected that they were con- taminated by the cross-loadings. Therefore, we remained uncer- tain about the true relations among our four constructs. This article describes how we took a core set of those pre- liminary items and developed a new instrument labeled the 96 Downloaded By: [University Of British Columbia] At: 23:30 3 January 2011