Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy Volume 5, Number 8 Editor in Chief KevinC.Klement,UniversityofMassachusetts Editorial Board AnnalisaColiva,UniversityofModenaandUCIrvine GregFrost-Arnold,HobartandWilliamSmithColleges HenryJackman,YorkUniversity SandraLapointe,McMasterUniversity ConsueloPreti,TheCollegeofNewJersey MarcusRossberg,UniversityofConnecticut AnthonySkelton,WesternUniversity MarkTextor,King’sCollegeLondon AudreyYap,UniversityofVictoria RichardZach,UniversityofCalgary Review Editors SeanMorris,MetropolitanStateUniversityofDenver SanfordShieh,WesleyanUniversity Design DanielHarris,HunterCollege jhaponline.org ©2017WalterB.Pedriali The Logical Significance of Assertion WalterB.Pedriali Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege’s conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege’s inclusion of the judgement-stroke (the formal counter- part of assertion) in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objec- tion goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.