Collaboration and coordination in the global political economy Vinod K. Aggarwal and Cédric Dupont ● Introduction 29 ● Goods: the incentives and obstacles to collaboration 29 ● Games: modelling decision making 32 ● Self-help or institutions? 40 ● The formation and evolution of institutions 45 ● Conclusion 47 READER’S GUIDE How can one understand the problems of collaboration and coordination in the global political economy? In situations of global interdependence, individual action by states often does not yield the desired result. Many argue that the solution to the problem of inter- dependence is to create international institutions, but this approach itself raises the issue of how states might go about creating such institutions in the first place. This chapter exam- ines the conditions under which joint action might be desired and provides an introduction to game theory as an approach to understanding interdependent decision making. It then discusses the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be developed and how they might facilitate the processes of collaboration and coordination of state actions. The chapter concludes by examining possible conflicts among institutions over their mandates to regulate an issue area. 2 Rave-02.qxd 27/8/04 5:14 PM Page 28