1 Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle Filip Grgić (The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in International Journal of Philosophical Studies (16 Sep 2021), www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790. Please cite the published version.) 1. Introduction In his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, Aristotle initially distinguishes between two types of involuntary events or actions: those that come about by force and those that come about because of ignorance. Later in the chapter, however, he makes a further distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance, only one of which can be described as involuntary: What comes about because of ignorance (di’ agnoian), for its part, is all non- voluntary (ouk hekousion), whereas being involuntary (akousion) belongs to what causes the agent pain and involves regret (metameleia); for the person who has done whatever it is because of ignorance, if he feels nothing by way of discomfort at his action, has not acted voluntarily (hekōn), in so far as it was something he didn’t know he was doing, but he has not acted involuntarily (akōn) either, in so far as he is not distressed at it. What comes about because of ignorance, then, seems to fall into two types: someone who feels regret seems to have acted involuntarily, while the one who does not feel regret – well, since he is distinct from the other person, let him be ‘non-voluntary’; for since he is different, it is better that he should have a name to himself. (EN 3.1.1110b18– 24) 1 Thus, a doctor who kills her patient by giving him the wrong drug because of ignorance has acted involuntarily if she feels regret for what she has done. If she does not feel regret, her action can be described as non-voluntary, rather than involuntary. This 1 All translations from EN are by Christopher Rowe (in Rowe and Broadie 2002), with modifications. (Rowe uses ‘countervoluntary’ for akousion.)