Moral Dilemmas and Vagueness Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik Received: 15 January 2011 /Accepted: 2 December 2011 /Published online: 30 December 2011 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Abstract In this paper we point out some interesting structural similarities between vagueness and moral dilemmas as well as between some of the proposed solutions to both problems. Moral dilemma involves a situation with opposed obligations that cannot all be satisfied. Transvaluationism as an approach to vagueness makes three claims concerning the nature of vagueness: (1) it involves incompatibility between mutually unsatisfiable requirements, (2) the underlying requirements retain their normative power even when they happen to be overruled, and (3) this incompatibility turns out to be rather benign in practice. Given that transvaluationism is inspired by moral dilemmas, these claims are assessed in respect to them. Transvaluationism provides a smooth account of the men- tioned claims concerning vagueness. Following a brief discussion of Sorensen’ s views on moral dilemmas and conflict vagueness, we offer a model of moral pluralism accommo- dating structurally similar claims about the nature of moral conflict and moral dilemmas. Keywords Moral dilemma . Vagueness . Transvaluationism . Duties and principles . Pluralism 1 Preliminaries After providing some examples of moral dilemmas, we present three claims that are shared by moral dilemmas and vagueness. Given that these claims about moral Acta Anal (2013) 28:207–222 DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0140-2 M. Potrč Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Aškerčeva 2, SI 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia e-mail: matjazpotrc@gmail.com V. Strahovnik (*) IPAK institute and Faculty for Government and European Studies, Kranj, Slovenia e-mail: vojko.strahovnik@guest.arnes.si V. Strahovnik Ulica Hermana Potočnika 21, SI 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia