853 ©2009AmericanSocietyofCriminology
Criminology&PublicPolicy•Volume8•Issue4
POLICY ESSAY
D E T E R R E N C E A N D E X E C U T I O N S
Don’tscrapthedeathpenalty
Paul H. Rubin
Emory University
I
havebeenaskedtocommentonthepolicyimplicationsof“Doesthedeathpenaltysave
lives?Newevidencefromstatepaneldata,1977To2006,”(Kovandzic,Vieraitis,and
Boots,2009,thisissue).Thearticledoesnothesitatetodrawitsownpolicyconclusions.
Kovandzicetal.concludethatbecausenoevidenceisprovidedforadeterrenteffect,“policy
makersshouldrefrainfromjustifyingitsusebyclaimingthatitisadeterrenttohomicideand
considerlesscostly,moreeffectivewaysofaddressingcrime.”Iwillbeequallyblunt;Idonot
thinkthattheirevidenceissuffcientlypersuasivetodrawtheconclusionstheydo,andIam
notinfavorofabolishingthedeathpenalty.
Iwillconsidertwoquestionsaboutthedeathpenalty.First,asexecutioniscurrentlyapplied
intheUnitedStates,doesitactuallyserveasadeterrent?Thisquestionwillrequireanexami-
nationofsomeassertionsintheKovandzicetal.(2009)articleaboutthenatureofcriminals
aswellasaboutthepredictionsofeconomictheory.Second,ifthedeathpenaltyiscurrentlya
deterrent,isitpowerfulenoughsothatexistingstatisticaltechniquescanmeasurethedeterrent
effect?Thisquestionwillentailanexaminationofthestatisticalanalysisofthearticle.
Is Capital Punishment a Deterrent Theory?
Inregardtothefrstquestion,atsomelevelofcertaintyandspeed,capitalpunishmentcould
serveasadeterrent.GordonTullockhasproposedthefollowingthoughtexperiment:Thinkof
acriminalpointingagunatapotentialvictimwithapolicemanstandingbehindthecriminal.
Thepolicemansays,“Youcanshoothim,butifyoudothenIwillshootyou.”Inthiscircum-
stance,thethreatofdeathcertainlywoulddetermostorallpotentialmurderers.Wethencan
thinkofactualsystemsasreducingtheprobabilityandspeedofexecution.Witheachreduction,
thelevelofdeterrencealsoisreducedbecausefewerpotentialmurdererswillbedeterredasthe
probabilityandspeedofexecutionisreduced.
Thanks to Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Joanna shepherd, and Grifn edwards for helpful comments. Direct
correspondence to Paul H. rubin, Department of economics, emory university, Atlanta, CA 30322 (e-mail:
prubin@emory.edu).