Simple and complex deceits and ironies Francesca M. Bosco * , Monica Bucciarelli 1 Centro di Scienza Cognitiva and Dipartimento di Psicologia, Universita ` di Torino, Via Po 14, 10123 Torino, Italy Received 2 February 2006; received in revised form 22 March 2007; accepted 18 May 2007 Abstract In the classical philosophy of language a distinction is made between direct and indirect speech acts. In the present paper we propose that a new distinction, between simple and complex communicative acts, can include any kind of pragmatic phenomena, including deceit and irony. In particular, we assume that a complex act, with respect to a simple act of the same sort, e.g., irony, requires a complex inferential chain in order to grasp the communicative intention of the speaker. Therefore, we predict that complex acts are more difficult to comprehend than simple acts. Furthermore, we assume that simple acts of different sorts, e.g., deceit and irony, involve mental representations of different degrees of complexity. Therefore, we predict that simple standard acts are easier than simple deceits, which are in turn easier than simple ironies. Overall our predictions are confirmed by the results of an experiment carried out on 96 children aged 6;6–10 years. Some unexpected results are also interpretable within the proposed framework. # 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Cognitive Pragmatics; Direct and indirect speech acts; Irony; Deceit; Communication; Development 1. Introduction In the classical philosophy of language, a distinction is drawn between direct and indirect speech acts. Searle (1975) claims that to comprehend an indirect speech act means to realize that an illocutionary act is (indirectly) being performed via the execution of a different, literal illocutionary act. On the other hand, a direct speech act occurs when a speaker utters a sentence that communicates exactly and literally what she intends to say, as in: [1] What time is it? www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008) 583–607 * Corresponding author at: Universita ` di Torino, Centro di Scienza Cognitiva, Via Po 14, 10123 Torino, Italy. Tel.: +39 011 670 30 58; fax: +39 011 815 90 39. E-mail addresses: bosco@psych.unito.it (F.M. Bosco), monica@psych.unito.it (M. Bucciarelli). 1 Tel.: +39 011 670 30 38; fax: +39 011 815 90 39. 0378-2166/$ – see front matter # 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.004