Joint Capability Development Joint Capability Development T he U.S. Joint Forces Command works the critical command and control seams of joint warfighting where all Services have concerns but none has a compelling reason to do anything about them. Due to a lack of preplanned, mandatory interoperability, there are significant challenges in executing command and control (C 2 ) of joint forces. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has provided solutions to some of these problems in the past and has recently reorganized its Joint Capability Development Directorate (J–8) to focus even more on integration, interoper- ability, and development of joint C 2 capabili- ties. This article outlines some root causes of the joint interoperability problem, highlights contributions made by USJFCOM to enhance joint interoperability and integration, and describes the organization and function of the reorganized J–8. Historically, the Services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps—have been responsible for designing, procuring, fielding, and sustaining their own combat gear. This stovepiped process is part of each Service’s Title 10 responsibility, which works well for Service-specific items. Even in joint command and control, where one would expect problems, this process was sufficient in the era of jointness up to and including Operation Desert Storm, where combat actions were largely deconflicted by space and time, and Service-provided forces did not so much work together as simply stay out of each other’s way. But beginning with Desert Storm and continuing today, the conduct of warfare has changed dramatically from large force- on-force operations between nations to complex, compressed clashes between state and nonstate actors. This shift from third- generation to fourth-generation warfare has driven combat forces from all Services to work more synchronously together, often side by side, to root out elusive opponents in conflicted urban terrain. Add to this change the advent of the digital revolution as well as the computeriza- tion of combat systems, and the complexity of operations increases significantly. In this environment, merely deconflicting forces no longer provides the joint synergy required to achieve goals. To succeed in fourth- generation warfare, command and control of Service-provided forces must be truly interoperable and interdependent. In this environment, current stovepiped require- ments and acquisition processes, based on Service Title 10 responsibilities alone, have failed to produce the interoperability and interdependency necessary to command and control today’s joint forces. This is not to say that the combat devel- opment community has sat idly by over the last decade. Interoperability has improved since Desert Storm, when the digital con- nectivity between the Services was so bad that a courier had to hand-carry the Joint Force Air Component Command air tasking order in hardcopy out to each Navy carrier. But correcting that shortcoming and others only addressed the most pressing C 2 problems found during that war. Those efforts did nothing to get ahead of the swelling wave of digitiza- tion that has hit the joint force and now mandates the need to pass data and voice on demand from national sensors to joint task force headquarters, between component com- mands, and on to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines over the last tactical mile. Such are the demands of warfare today. They were fore- shadowed in Somalia, where having timely and relevant blue force tracking could have saved lives. These demands are currently scrawled in the sands of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Both U.S. and coalition forces are frustrated by the confusion, redundancy, and inefficiency that hamstring their valiant efforts to crush insurgencies, root out terrorism, and build safe and stable nations. Despite improvements, there is much work to do, and the Service-centric devel- opment of what are inherently joint and interdependent C 2 systems will not get the job done. In fact, this Service-centric approach has led to the development of multiple, often redundant capabilities, many fielded on the fly in Iraq and Afghanistan. These capabilities might work well for the unit or Service that fielded them, but they are either incapable of working together effectively with command and control capabilities from other Services in a joint context or so duplicative that they clog bandwidth and reduce capability in a cluttered, constrained environment. A few examples drive the point home. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Army units used Colonel Bryon Greenwald, USA, is Chief of Staff in the Joint Capability Development Directorate (J–) at U.S. Joint Forces Command. By BRYON GREENWALD both U.S. and coalition forces are frustrated by the confusion, redundancy, and inefficiency that hamstring their efforts Soldier communicates to Apache helicopter during capture of insurgents in Adhamiyah, Iraq Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Keith Devinney) 50 JFQ /  issue 44, 1 st quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu