179 WHAT IS DEONTOLOGY? PART TWO: REASONS TO ACT The Journal of Value Inquiry 35: 179–193, 2001. © 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. What is Deontology? Part Two: Reasons to Act GERALD F. GAUS Department of Philosophy, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118-5698, USA Part One of this essay considered familiar ways of characterizing deontology, which focus on the notions of the good and the right. Here we will take up alternative approaches, which stress the type of reasons for actions that are generated by deontological theories. Although some of these alternative conceptualizations of deontology also employ a distinction between the good and the right, all mark the basic contrast between deontology and teleology in terms of reasons to act. 1. Deontology as a Distinctive Ethical Response Teleology, it will be recalled, is commonly defined as a theory in which the only right-making properties are good-promoting properties, while deontology is characterized by any other theory. We saw in Part One, however, that it is difficult to distinguish good-promoting rightness from other right-making properties. This problem stems from the common characterization of all worthy, desirable, or normatively favorable properties as good. If we cannot adequately distinguish them, the most familiar method of characterizing deontology is unhelpful. One way to solve this problem is to develop a specific characterization of goodness or value, so that we have conceptual room to speak of what is right but not good-promoting. Another way, suggested by H.A. Prichard, is to distinguish between the good and the right in terms of the directives they yield: the good attracts our desires while the right tells us what we must do. A different proposal for solving this problem has recently been advanced by Phillip Pettit and others. It retains a very broad conception of value, covering the full range of the normative, and then characterizes teleology and deontology as different ways of responding to value. According to Pettit, a consequentialist believes that “the proper way to respond to any values recognized is to promote them: that is, in every choice set to select the option with prognoses that mean it is the best gamble with those values.” 1 In contrast: