Why TTIP is an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer, but not a Polanyian moment Leif Johan Eliasson, East Stroudsburg University (jeliasson@esu.edu) Patricia Garcia-Duran, University of Barcelona (patriciagarciaduran@ub.edu) Abstract 1 This paper looks at the TTIP from a trade policy perspective. It argues that while TTIP is an unprecedented bilateral agreement, it does not constitute a Polanyian moment. TTIP is unprecedented in both EU and international trade policy terms because it offers an alternative to WTO multilateralism. Never before has bilateralism offered such a ‘best alternative to no agreement’ (BATNA) to members of the core decision-making body of the WTO negotiating arm, making TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer. The anti-TTIP campaign, however, has not been driven either by geopolitical or trade liberalization concerns but by fears about EU bargaining power. By strategically focusing on the potential impact on public policy and safety standards, normative arguments promulgated by opponents to TTIP reflect concerns with perceived threats to the EU status quo, and a willingness to preserve the same. The US is presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able to impose its preferences which are considered too neo-liberal. 1. Introduction When TTIP negotiations commenced in 2013 proponents’ main arguments centered on the agreement’s potential economic benefits. Removing most or all tariffs and (up to) half of non- tariff barriers would increase trade and investments, spur growth, and create jobs (Felbermayr, 2013; François, 2013). The economic benefits of a TTIP for both Europe and the US far exceed those resulting from a potential completion of the Doha Round, and are worth five times the EU-South Korean deal (cf.eg. Erixon and Bauer 2010). Economic gains notwithstanding, the debate has come to focus predominantly on standards and geopolitical gains, with advocates arguing that TTIP would go further than any previous agreement; setting high global standards in most sectors, while solidifying the rules-based international system erected primarily by the transatlantic partners after WWII. Opponents tend to disagree, arguing TTIP may threaten public health, safety, and services. This paper first looks at how TTIP’s (potential) geopolitical impact makes it unique in international and EU trade policy. We examine how TTIP is unprecedented because it implies creating an alternative to multilateralism through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and that in turn reflects a shift in EU trade policy bilateral approach. In fact, never before has bilateralism offered such an appealing ‘best alternative to no agreement’ (BATNA) in the WTO. By so doing, we complement De Bièvre & Poletti’s public goods approach (this debate-section) on the international implications of TTIP, while challenging their conclusion that this agreement is not (so) unique.