Barrier to Entry: The Political Economy of H1-B Visas MICHAEL REKSULAK ‡ , WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II § AND GÖKHAN R. KARAHAN † ‡ School of Economic Development, Georgia Southern University, P.O. Box 8152, Statesboro, GA 30460-8152 § Department of Economics, University of Mississippi, P. O. Box 1848, University, MS 38677- 1848 † Department of Finance and Economics, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA 70310 October 2006 Preliminary Draft: Please do not quote without permission. ABSTRACT Securing an H-1B visa represents one of the foremost avenues for foreign workers with an advanced degree to join the U.S. labor force. In its present form, it has permitted millions of so qualified individuals (and their spouses and children) to enter the U.S. In the process, the quota system implemented by Congress consistently served as an ineffective ceiling. The proverbial fence was climbed many times, although legally. This paper analyzes the legislative history of the program economically and attempts to explain the issuance of H-1B visas utilizing socio- economic variables.