Distributive Politics In A Strong Party System: Evidence From Canadian Job Grant Programs Eric Crampton University of Canterbury eric.crampton@canterbury.ac.nz To be presented at the Public Choice Society Annual Meetings, March 2004. Abstract: The distributive politics literature following Weingast (1979) predicts majoritarian redistribution within strong party systems. This prediction is tested using evidence from Canadian job creation grant programs active during the mid-1990s. Results provide strong evidence against the hypothesis of generalized majoritarian redistribution. Districts represented by the governing Liberal Party received lower grant allocations than did other districts, both absolutely and conditional on the unemployment variables on which allocation decisions were to have been made. However, districts represented by vulnerable Cabinet Ministers received disproportionate allocations, as did Liberal districts in western Canada. Evidence supports the swing voter hypothesis in the west, with weak support for the loyal voter hypothesis elsewhere. The author thanks the Center for Study of Public Choice, the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, and Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung for support. Comments from Bryan Caplan, Tyler Cowen, Mark Crain, Thomas Stratmann, and from seminar participants at George Mason University’s Brown Bag Seminar, at Carleton University’s Economics Department, and at Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung were especially helpful; the standard disclaimer applies.