Equal Opportunity is not Valuable 159 © Society for Applied Philosophy, 2004 © Society for Applied Philosophy, 2004, Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2004 Why Equal Opportunity is not a Valuable Goal STEPHEN KERSHNAR  In this paper, I provide an analysis of equal opportunity. I argue that equal opportunity occurs where two or more persons with equal natural abilities and willingness to work hard have chances at various jobs that are in the aggregate of equal value. I then argue that equal opportunity is neither valuable nor something that the government ought to pursue. First, it is not clear why we should value opportunities rather than outcomes. Second, the value of equal opportunity rests on the value of interest satisfaction. However, if interest satisfaction is relatively constant across different jobs and different job opportunities, then the concern for interest satisfaction will not ground the value of equal opportunity. Third, equalizing oppor- tunities is not in itself valuable because persons are not equally valuable. Fourth, even if equal opportunity were valuable, the government could pursue it only by trespassing on individual rights. Two laws that have shaped and continue to shape life in the United States are the 1964 Civil Rights Act (banning race and sex discrimination in the government and private businesses) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (requiring the government and private businesses to provide reasonable accommodation for the disabled). The executive implementation of affirmative-action requirements also has a considerable influence on the business world in America. Some proponents of affirmative action regulations and the Americans with Disabilities Act argued for them on the ground that they promote the value of equal opportunity [1]. Even the conservative critics of these laws or the policies that have resulted from them (e.g., affirmative action) pay lip service to the underlying goal of equal opportunity. Laws promoting equality of opportunity also govern the European Union. For example, the European Court of Justice has mandated measures to ensure the applica- tion of the principles of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation. This includes the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value [2]. The treaty that established the European Community enables it to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. Also, for example, in Britain the government has a department (the Equal Opportunities Commission) whose function is to promote equality of opportunity. If it can be shown that equal opportunity is not worth pursuing, then the case for these laws must rest on some other ground, such as compensatory justice or efficiency. The purpose of this essay is to show that equal opportunity is not valuable and that the pursuit of it will override things that are valuable. In arguing that equality of opportunity is not valuable, I mean to argue in favour of two theses. First, I argue that equality of opportunity is neither intrinsically good nor a part of an intrinsically valuable state of affairs. Second, I argue that there is no noncontractual duty to bring it about.