The Right to Privacy: A Discourse-Theoretical Approach* BLANCA R. RUIZ Abstract. The relative importance of the right to privacy in constitutional demo- cracies is reconsidered on the basis of discourse theory. To this end the author does not regard privacy as an aim in itself but as a provider of freedom, and concentrates on the key role that freedom plays in discourse-theoretical constructions of constitu- tional democracies. That this century has witnessed an impressive growth in people’s demands for the protection of their privacy seems uncontroversial; that public power often leaves these demands unheeded seems equally uncontroversial. Public power, including the power of courts, is often reluctant to give privacy a priority on the scales of interests deserving constitutional protection as funda- mental rights, particularly when privacy is compared with other interests with which it often collides, such as free speech, national security or public order. This article will argue that privacy does deserve a high position, and that the failure in granting it is related to two misapprehensions concerning privacy and the role it plays in constitutional democracies. I will deal with these two misapprehensions separately. 1. Privacy and What Privacy Is Wanted for The first misapprehension is conceptual and therefore affects the under- standing of privacy at its basis. The idea that the concept of privacy is not properly grasped by courts and scholars has been put forward too often for it to bring anything new to the understanding of privacy, other than, Ratio Juris. Vol. 11 No. 2 June 1998 (155–67) © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. * I am grateful to Robert Alexy for his encouraging comments on a previous draft. Thanks also go to Robbin Herring for useful discussions on the topic, and to Hugh Herring for doing the English correction. I am indebted foremost to Massimo La Torre for his valuable comments and his constant support.