Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2009 DOI number: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00457.x © Society for Applied Philosophy, 2009, Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford, UK JAPP Journal of Applied Philosophy 0264-3758 0264-3758 © Society for Applied Philosophy, 2009 XXX Original Article Not Making Exceptions: A Response to Shue Vittorio Bufacchi Not Making Exceptions: A Response to Shue VITTORIO BUFACCHI  This article refutes Henry Shue’s claim that in the case of preventive military attacks it is sometimes morally permissible to make an exception to the fundamental principle regarding the inviolability of individual rights. By drawing on a comparison between torture and preventive military attacks, I will argue that the potential risks of institutionalizing preventive military attacks — what I call the Institutionalizing Argument — are far too great to even contemplate. Two potential risks with setting up a bureaucracy which specializes in preventive military attacks will be highlighted: that any preventive military strike may nourish a cycle of violence that will inevitably cause more deaths and destruction than could ever be justified; and that such preventive military strikes may be abused by political leaders in a desperate effort to hold on to power, including democratically elected political leaders working within a democratic framework. ‘Making Exceptions’ is yet another engrossing and thought provoking paper from Professor Henry Shue, one of the best known and most influential philosophers working in applied ethics. The crux of his argument is to compare three pressing moral problems in public affairs, all of which may potentially demand that exceptions are made to the principle regarding the inviolability of individual rights. The trio of cases under investigation are: 1. The mitigation of climate change; 2. Preventive military attacks; 3. The use of torture. Henry Shue argues that the proposed exception is fully justified in the case of climate change, sometimes justified in the case of preventive attack, but never justified in the case of torture. In what follows, I will concentrate exclusively on the latter two issues, namely preventive military attacks and the use of torture. I will argue that while Henry Shue is right to maintain that in the case of torture it is never morally permissible to make an exception to the fundamental principle regarding the inviolability of individual rights, he is wrong to suggest that it is sometimes permissible to do so for the sake of preventive military attacks. In other words, unlike Henry Shue I will try to defend an absolutist position in the case of preventive military attacks. While critically important in its own right, I will not comment on Henry Shue’s view on the mitigation of climate change, in part because of space constraints, and in part because I find myself in full agreement with Henry Shue on this issue. Let us begin with torture. The ethics of torture in general and the torture of terrorists in particular is a hot topic amongst legal, moral and political philosophers today, and