Constructivist Facts as the Bridge Between Is and Ought Draft version. Jaap Hage 1 jaap.hage@maastrichtuniversity.nl www.jaaphage.nl ABSTRACT This article describes how the facts in social reality take an intermediate position between objective facts and purely subjective ‘facts’. These social facts can in turn be subdivided into constructivist and non-constructivist facts. The defining difference is that non-constructivist facts are completely determined by a consensus between the members of a social group, while constructivist facts are founded in such a consensus but can nevertheless be questioned. Ought fact are such constructivist facts. Because they are founded in social reality, a naturalistic theory of ought facts is attractive. Because constructivist facts are always open to questioning, we have an explanation why the facts of social reality may found ought facts, but are nevertheless not the final word about them. Keywords: Constructivist facts, Is, Ought, Social reality 1 What is the issue? “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.” (Hume 1978, p. 469) This fragment from Hume’s Treatise has become the starting point of endless debates about Is and Ought, the alleged fundamental difference between the two, and the possibility to derive ought- statements from only is-statements (Brecht 1959). The debates have not only been endless, but they are often also vague or confused. For instance, they often lack precise circumscriptions of what belongs to the realms of Is and Ought, or what is meant by derivation, or by possibility. In this article I will make another attempt to show how the alleged gap 1 I want to thank the participants in the webinar on Global Semiotics (16 September 2021) for their stimulating remarks and questions.