Reconciling the Two Images Andrew Brook Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies Carleton University Ottawa, ON., Canada K1S 5B6 Abstract Some of the indecisiveness and lack of common purpose that characterizes cognitive science at the moment, I argue, can be explained by its lack of success so far in connecting the scientific, computational image (better, images) of cognition developed in cognitive science to people as we experience them in ordinary life, society, law, literature, etc. Following Sellars (1963), we call these two ways of representing cognizers the scientific image and the manifest image. The scientific image sees persons and also artificial cognitive systems as vast assemblages of postulated units of some kind. In the manifest image, persons are seen as unified centre of representation, deliberation and action, able to reach focused, unified decisions and take focused, unified actions. Much of the paper is devoted to exploring the murkier of the two, the manifest image. It is richer and more diverse than might at first be thought. The Problems Facing Cognitive Science The problems currently facing cognitive science have been a subject of much discussion lately. As a number of speakers observed at the workshop on Cognitive Science Education at the meetings of the Cognitive Science Society in 1994, even after forty years of work, cognitive science is still far from having a unified research programme. In this regard, the neurosciences make an interesting comparison. Though much more recent as a self- identified activity, their major international organization has over ten times the members of the Cognitive Science Society and its members aren't constantly worrying about its progress. The problems run very deep: sometimes it is difficult to know how to take or assess the very claims that cognitive science makes. Doubtless there are many reasons why cognitive science is facing problem but one of them, I think, is this. Using the terms introduced by the andrew_brook@carleton.ca