c  2007 Imprint Academic Mind & Matter Vol. 5(2), pp. 215–240 Mind – Body – Spirituality Harald Walach School of Social Sciences & Samueli Institute, European Office University of Northampton Northampton, United Kingdom Abstract The argument of this paper is that the modern brain-conscious- ness debate has left out one important element: the question of a transpersonal or spirit-like element of consciousness. Thus the problem really is not a mind-body-problem or brain-consciousness problem, but a mind-body-spirit or brain-consciousness-soul prob- lem. Looking at the history of the debate it can be seen that, ex- plicitly or implicitly, this aspect has always been part of the philo- sophical debate. Most notably, this can be seen in the Aristotelian concept of the soul, which held that form and matter were both together necessary to constitute a unity. But on top of that, a Pla- tonic strand of teaching existed in Aristotle, which was lost. This tradition stipulated an aspect of the soul, the active intellect, that was separate and separable. This idea has inspired other and later writers into postulating an immortal part of the soul. In the modern debate this tradition has been lost and was frequently amalgamated with dualist positions. Phenomenological descriptions of mystical experiences, as well as other unusual (or exceptional) mind-matter anomalies suggest that this aspect of the problem needs reconsid- eration. For this purpose a transcendental kind of monism is sug- gested which does not violate the consensus that only a monist description of the world is scientifically viable. Such a position would, in addition, provide the option to incorporate the transper- sonal side of the debate. 1. Distinguishing Personal and Transpersonal Views It is suggested that there are two essentially different aspects of the mind-body problem: (a) There is the brain-consciousness or traditional mind-body problem. It is addressed by asking questions like: Can the phenomenal quali- ties which characterize our experience of “mind” be reduced to the physical qualities of patterned neuron-discharges ? Is the brain alone sufficient to give rise to personal consciousness, or do we need a sep- arate entity? Is consciousness a “real”, non-reducible entity which nevertheless is completely causally dependent or supervenient on