Studies in Philosophy and Education 17: 101–122, 1998. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 101 Inquiry and Analysis: Dewey and Russell on Philosophy SCOTT L. PRATT Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, U.S.A. Abstract. In an environment characterized by the emergence of new and diverse (and often opposed) philosophical efforts, there is a need for a conception of philosophy that will promote the exchange and critical consideration of divergent insights. Depending upon the operative conception, philosoph- ical efforts can be viewed as significant, insightful and instructive, or unimportant, misguided and not “real” philosophy. This paper develops John Dewey’s conception of philosophy as a mode of inquiry in contrast with Bertrand Russell’s conception of philosophy as a mode of analysis. I argue that while Russell’s analytic conception of philosophy justifies the dismissal of non-analytic philosophies, Dewey’s conception of philosophy provides a theoretical framework for the comparison, evaluation and interaction of alternatives. Key words: Dewey, Russell, theory of inquiry, analytic philosophy, conceptions of philosophy Conceptions of philosophy are important, as a matter of practical concern, because they serve as a guide for the evaluation of particular philosophical efforts and a standard by which such efforts are judged. Depending upon the operative concep- tion, philosophical efforts can be viewed as significant, insightful and instructive, or unimportant, misguided and not “real” philosophy. In this paper, I develop John Dewey’s conception of philosophy as a mode of inquiry in contrast with Bertrand Russell’s conception of philosophy as a mode of analysis. The context in which the contrast will be developed is illustrated by repre- sentative concerns raised by philosophers in alternative philosophical traditions. A feminist philosopher, Susan Sherwin, for example, describes her frustration in encountering colleagues in philosophy who insist that the work she and other feminist philosophers do is “not philosophy.” These critics, she argues, “are always eager to make clear their tolerance for radical thought. Rather, they say, the problem is with the sloppiness, the ignorance, the incompetence of the author qua philos- opher. If they [the critics] were to write feminist philosophy, they suggest, they would do a far more ‘professional’ job of it.” Despite the way that the problem is explained by the critics, however, Sherwin concludes that the real issue is that “there are important differences in approach that reflect the divergent paradigms” of two models of philosophical investigation (Sherwin, 1989: 23). “Feminism,” she