1 THE ‘NEW MEMORY-CRITERIA’ OF IDENTITY PAUL TURNER Abstract: Opponents of germline intervention often argue that fundamental ideas of human identity are under threat. This paper argues that the fundamental ideas of human identity are not under threat because of germline intervention. This paper presents the idea of ‘genetic-continuity’ as a new form of human identity which is retained through the consistency of the individual’s genome and argues that this new idea of identity is not sufficient to explain the human experience and that human identity is not determined by genes. As such, this paper concludes that germline intervention does not harm the fundamental ideas of human identity. Opponents to germline intervention (GI) often argue that fundamental concepts of human identity are under threat through interventions into the genome, claiming that those edited will be ‘inauthentic’ or will lose their ‘origins’. I argue that our fundamental concepts of identity need to be updated and in turn this refutes the claim that GI causes the decline in human identity. The fundamental concepts of identity can be understood through two competing theories: the physical-criteria and the criteria of psychological-continuity. Both have a genetic component, but the genes do not define ‘identity’. Identity is attained through our actions, thus is based on psychological- continuity. I do not believe there is much need in discussing the benefits and limitations of GI here, but I will show that the physical-criteria is a weaker construction of identity, and with it so is constructing identity on the grounds of genetic continuants. As such, the claim that identity will ‘decline’ because of GI is false. I will conclude this by arguing that the criteria of psychological- continuity has a stronger claim to identity regardless of the genetic basis of the individual. That said, I also argue that the criteria of psychological-continuity needs to be updated and I will propose ‘the new memory-criteria’ to include modern understandings of the brain and through the influence of neurosciences to show that our identity is imprinted through our experience and action and these make significant changes to our epigenome and neural networks. Ultimately, we are in control of ourselves on top of our genes. As such, I refute claims of genetic determinism that suggest we are our genes and thus claim that identity is not, to a fair degree, affected by limited GI. Firstly, I will outline the terminologies used in this paper. Secondly, I will outline the ‘new memory-criteria’, both its genesis through psychological-continuity and its differences to the physical- criteria and argue that psychological-continuity is the best candidate to be the continuant of human identity. Lastly, I shall introduce the Alexa Problem where a human and machine both have the same genes and comparable brain to expose the weaknesses and strengths of the competing criteria of identity for comparison. TERMINOLOGIES I will adopt some specific terms in the paper, for expediency I shall explain the meanings to attach to these here. Identity theories: Theories of identity relate to how the ‘same person’ remains this ‘same person’ over time and by what continuants. The common interpretations are the physical-criteria and the criteria of psychological-continuity. The physical-criteria suggests that the person will have the same body or brain at t2 as at t1. Whereas, psychological-continuity suggests that P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 if and only if P2 at t2 is psychologically continuous with P1 at t1. I will also propose, and reject, the interpretation of ‘genetic-continuity’ that argues P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 if and only if P2 at t2 is has the same genes as P1 at t1.