Corporate governance and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa: An empirical analysis Musa Mangena a, ⁎ , Eddie Chamisa b a Lecturer in Accounting, Bradford University School of Management, England, UK b Senior Lecturer in Accounting, Department of Accounting, University of Cape Town, South Africa Abstract We examine the association between corporate governance structures and incidences of listing suspension from the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa. Using a matched-pairs research design, we compare 81 firms suspended between 1999 and 2005 to an equal number of control firms matched in terms of time, size and industry. Employing a conditional logistic model, we find that the likelihood of suspension is higher in firms with a smaller proportion of non- executive directors, without an audit committee, and with greater block-share ownership and higher gearing (i.e. leverage). Further analysis splitting block-share ownership into institutional and non-institutional investors provides mixed results. While we find a positive association between suspension and non-institutional investors, we observe no association with institutional investors. No association is detected for board size, role duality, directors' share ownership, auditor quality and return on assets. Given the paucity of studies examining listing suspension from stock exchanges and corporate governance mechanisms, these findings contribute to the literature. Additionally, the dearth of research on corporate governance in developing countries suggests that our findings have important implications for policy makers in these countries as they endeavor to improve corporate governance. © 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved. Keywords: Corporate governance; Listing suspension; JSE Securities Exchange; Developing countries; South Africa Available online at www.sciencedirect.com The International Journal of Accounting 43 (2008) 28 – 44 ⁎ Corresponding author. Accounting and Finance Group, Bradford University School of Management, Emm Lane, Bradford, BD9 4JL, UK. Tel.: +44 1274 234340; fax: +44 1274 235680. E-mail address: m.mangena@bradford.ac.uk (M. Mangena). 0020-7063/$30.00 © 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.01.002