Why does the Parliamentary Regime Perform Better: Bureaucratic Power versus Veto Players ∗ Marina Dodlova † Abstract The political economy literature underlines that in presidential regimes politicians are more accountable to citizens because of the greater executive con- straints and “checks and balances” system. However, empirical studies testify that parliamentary regimes perform better. This paper contributes to finding an explanation of such a puzzle by studying a scope of bureaucratic power in political decision-making. By bureaucratic power we mean rubber-stamping by politicians of their bureaucrats’ policy propositions without effective control. We demonstrate that the parliamentary regime has institutional constraints to limit power of bureaucrats while the presidential regime structure tends to promote informal agreements between politicians and bureaucrats. JEL: D72, D73, D78, H00 Key words: Bureaucracy, delegation, informal authority, political regime, veto player * This paper is for presenting at the 2011 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society. † I would like to apply for the Wicksell Prize Competition. I am 29 years old. The date of birth is October 4, 1981. EconomiX, Universit´ e Paris Ouest - Nanterre la D´ efense, CNRS, France. E-mail: mdodlova@gmail.com 1