Fishing effort control policies and ship stability: Analysis of a string of accidents in Spain in the period 2004–2007 Francisco Mata-A ´ lvarez-Santullano a,n , Antonio Souto-Iglesias b a Maritime Accident and Incident Investigation Standing Commission, Ministry for Development and Transport, Government of Spain, Paseo de la Castellana 67, 28071 Madrid, Spain b Model Basin Research Group (CEHINAV), Naval Architecture Department (ETSIN), Technical University of Madrid (UPM), 28040 Madrid, Spain article info Article history: Received 13 September 2012 Received in revised form 13 October 2012 Accepted 19 December 2012 Available online 24 January 2013 Keywords: Fishing effort control Ship stability Accident Capsizing Safety regulations Gross tonnage abstract A number of similar Spanish fishing vessels designed and built after the entry into force of the 1998 fishing effort control regulations —Royal Decree 2287/1998—capsized in a relatively short period of time (2004–2007). The accidents are described and identified herein as a statistical anomaly within the Spanish fleet. The main dimensions and initial stability characteristics of the capsized vessels are compared with those of the vessels decommissioned in order to build the capsized ones, unveiling a reduction in marginal stability. This reduction is linked to the fishing effort control policies and subsequent regulatory framework. The influence of fishing effort control policies on ship safety is discussed. Conclusions and some recommendations are finally presented. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction The control of fishing effort is a vital part of fisheries management. In the framework of the European Common Fisheries Policies (CFP), a tool to exert such control has been the limitation of tonnage (measured as gross tonnage GT) and propulsion power. Major mile- stones in these policies have been the promulgations of the Multi- Annual Guidance Programmes in the period 1983–2007 [1]. In order to fulfill the objectives of the 1997 program [2] as well as promoting the modernization of the fleet, a specific regulation, the Royal Decree (RD) 2287/1998, was approved in Spain in 1998. Commercial fishing is one of the most hazardous occupations with fatality rates being widely documented in the specialized literature. In the US there are around 130 fatalities per year for every 100,000 fishing sector workers, compared to 4 for the rest of sectors [3]; similar alarming figures are reported in the UK [4]. Nonetheless, the global available data is scarce [5], and published analyses are there- fore usually supported by local or national fleet data [6–8] with some using methodologies which can be applied globally [9]. Although US oriented, the works of Jin et al. [10,11] have provided a rigorous basis for such methodology. They investi- gated the determinants of vessel losses and related injuries to find that around 4 fatalities are expected from every 100 ship lossess and that the probability of a total loss and crew fatalities varies inversely with the price of fish catches. The connections between fishing policies and the occurrence of fishing accidents have seldom been investigated. Windle et al., [12] highlights this problem, focusing on occupational health, and building a conceptual model that identifies potential health and safety risks and linking them with regulation guidelines. Perez- Labajos et al., [9] suggests that the reduction of fishing vessel accidents in Spain between 1994 and 2002 was mainly due to the fleet modernization programs put in place during this period. Links between fishing control policies and vessel accidents for that same fleet in a slightly posterior period are investigated in the present paper. Between November 2004 and September 2007, five Spanish- flagged ships capsized due to loss of stability resulting in a large part of their crew dead. Examining the five accidents side by side, it is noticeable that the vessels had similar characteristics, in particular that they had all been built between 1999 and 2001 and their lengths ranged between 15 and 24 m. When they were capsized, their age ranged from three to eight years. The vessels had been designed and built according to the Spanish stability regulation, which included the International Maritime Organization (IMO) stability criteria for fishing vessels [13], basically unmodified since 1970. However, the construction projects for these vessels had been elaborated not only adjusting to this framework but also complying with the aforementioned Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol Marine Policy 0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.12.027 n Corresponding author. Tel.: þ34 5977159; fax: þ34 91 5978569. E-mail addresses: fmata@fomento.es (F. Mata-A ´ lvarez-Santullano), antonio.souto@upm.es (A. Souto-Iglesias). Marine Policy 40 (2013) 10–17