BOOK REVIEW Realism vs anti-realism and alternative logics Shahid Rahman, Giuseppe Primiero and Mathieu Marion (eds): The realism-antirealism debate in the age of alternative logics. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, 346pp, €149,75 HB Costas Dimitracopoulos Published online: 9 February 2013 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 The editors have prepared this volume in response to a proposal made some time ago, namely that it was high time to publish a collection of papers concerning the realism–anti-realism debate in view of recent developments in logic. Well-known experts have contributed presentations of new insights on the debate concerning the relation between knowledge and logic, which has been going on since (at least) the 1960s. The issue at stake is whether or not there exists a gap between the sciences and logic, which essentially amounts to deciding whether or not logic should be related to knowledge from an epistemic viewpoint. According to the epistemic approach, one should accept as central the notion of judgement, that is take a completely different position than the classical, that is Post-Fregean, approach, which regards the notion of proposition as central. Followers of the epistemic approach have used intuitionistic logic to support their stance, while those opting for the classical approach have justified their choice using the Frege-Tarski tradition. In an attempt to combine the two approaches, Hintikka developed a novel approach in the 1960s, which was characterized as ‘explicit epistemic’ and is based on the introduction of an epistemic operator in the formal language, while the original epistemic approach, now called ‘implicit epistemic’, considers the epistemic content as a metalogical constraint on the notion of inference. The collection is composed of 18 chapters, covering a wide variety of topics. I give a brief description of each contribution, following the order in the table of contents. In the first contribution, Patrick Allo argues in favor of informational pluralism by combining the Generalized Tarski Thesis, due to J. C. Beall and Greg Restall, and a generalization of the Inverse Relationship Principle, due to John Barwise. Thus, by speaking of content and content-containment from a realist’s point of view, one is led to a commitment to pluralism, since the monist thesis that C. Dimitracopoulos (&) Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, University Campus, 15771 Athens, Greece e-mail: cdimitr@phs.uoa.gr 123 Metascience (2013) 22:439–442 DOI 10.1007/s11016-013-9751-0