INESAP Information Bulletin No.26, June 2006 48 Advanced technology is an essential el- ement of both the economy and nation- al security. While the dichotomy be- tween civilian and military technology has been more pronounced during the East-West conflict, the boundaries eroded after the end of the Cold War. In the past, the military was often thought to be a pacemaker in many fields of high-tech development, even though the spin-offs remained less than expect- ed. Scarce resources and lack of public acceptance, combined with converging demand profiles, supported the dual- use of civil and military technologies, exploiting the ambivalence of science. 1 Dual-use refers here to those technolo- gies that have actual or potential mili- tary and civilian applications. The strat- egy of “commercial-off-the-shelf” (COTS) development puts more em- phasis on spin-in: taking advantage of economies of scale, a technology devel- oped in the civilian-commercial sector is used for military purposes. Modern semiconductor, nuclear, laser, bio, com- puter, and communication technolo- gies, to mention a few, are employed not only in the manufacture of civilian products but also increasingly in the production of weapons. Dual-Use and Ambivalence of Science and Technology Scientific knowledge and technical know-how are essential preconditions for weapons development and sources of proliferation. Their export is widely seen as detrimental to international se- curity. Countries that either want to keep their advantage in military tech- nologies or want to prevent negative impacts on their own security are more ready to control their exports of “sensi- tive” technologies to “critical” coun- tries. Major suppliers have agreed that certain technologies which are clearly devoted to the development and pro- duction of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological) and re- lated dual-use items, including delivery systems, should be subject to strict ex- port controls. When the Wassenaar Arrangement replaced the COCOM list in 1996, the export control focus shifted from an East-West to a North-South context, which is also true for the Trig- ger List of the London Nuclear Suppli- ers Club, the Australia Group for chem- ical weapons, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 2 The changes in the definition of “the enemy” and the shift towards actual warfighting have expanded the tasks for the military which pushes towards a “Revolution in Military Affairs”. To strengthen the supposed technology lead of the United States against potential competitors and adversaries, the US De- partment of Defense has published since 1989 an annual list of about 20 military- critical technologies (MCTL) which pro- vides a “compendium of existing goods and technologies that DOD assesses would permit significant advances in the development, production and use of mil- itary capabilities of potential adver- saries.” The MCTL is accompanied by the Developing Science and Technologies List (DSTL) which comprises “scientific and technological capabilities being de- veloped worldwide that have the poten- tial to significantly enhance or degrade US military capabilities in the future.” 3 In 1997, the Clinton Administration ini- tiated the Dual-Use Applications Pro- gram (DUAP) which was designed to fo- cus only on technologies that are potentially useful to the military and by making awards through a competitive se- lection process. 4 The Bush Administra- tion in turn changed tacks, focusing less on dual-use and more on dedicated mili- tary technology. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the declared “war on terror- ism,” the parameters changed again. Ac- cording to Judith Reppy, “the old cer- tainties of the Cold War have disappeared, but the need to control the proliferation of weapons technology has not.” The new security environment “effectively demolished the rigid cate- gories of the Cold War, which had made it possible to frame the problems of dual use as involving promotion and control of military-relevant technologies in a state-based regime with a clearly-de- fined enemy. The contemporary strate- gic landscape is much more ambiguous and the list of potentially dual-use tech- nologies much more expansive.” 5 More attention was paid to biological weapons and the potential danger from developments in biotechnology, the “quintessential dual-use technology”. Jay Stowsky identifies three major trends in the new era: “the shift of tech- nological leadership from the military to the commercial sector, the decline of technological dominance by U.S.-based firms, and the emergence of critical dual-use technologies that can be con- stituted and thus easily disseminated electronically.” 6 Conditions have also changed for space systems and related rocket tech- nologies. With the increasing privatiza- tion and commercialization of outer space and the emphasis of the Bush Ad- ministration on missile defense and space dominance, spaceflight moved again to the center of the international security debate. The “missile threat” from emerging military powers such as Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan competes with the nuclear threat. In both fields dual-use is an essential prob- lem that requires international control efforts to diminish the security risks. In the MCTL, the list of critical space tech- nologies takes the largest part. Peaceful Purposes and the Mili- tary Use of Outer Space During the Cold War, space technology was a synonym for technological progress and military dominance. Outer Dual-Use in a New Security Environment The Case of Missiles and Space Jürgen Scheffran Dual Use: Missiles and Space