Defusing Intrusion Capabilities by Collaborative Anomalous Trust Management Khalil Abuosba 1 , Clemens Martin 2 Philadelphia University, University of Ontario Institute of Technology kh_abuosba@philadelphia.edu.jo, clemens.martin@uoit.ca Abstract From a computer security perspective, services provided by distributed information systems may be organized based on their security attributes goals and requirements; these processes and services are categorized as anonymous, registered, encrypted and trusted. In this research, we propose a solution for operational trust assurance problems where vulnerabilities reduction is implicitly observed. Collaborative Anomalous Trust Management (CATM) is a methodology that may be utilized for the purpose of affirming trust between communications endpoints. In conjunction with Trusted Computing Base, Zero Knowledge Protocol, and Layered Trust, CATM is defined. CATM builds its trust credentials based on computing environment variables. Ideally this methodology is suited for Service Oriented Architectures such as web services where service providers and consumers interact at different levels of security requirements. This methodology is best optimized for use as a risk management utility. In this approach vulnerabilities are implicitly reduced, hence intrusion capabilities are defused. 1. Introduction In distributed systems environments, avoiding potential loss of information security attributes is a major goal in B2B processes. Distributed systems are characterized as autonomous computers that might be built and deployed based on different architectures and platforms; securing these heterogeneous systems is considered to be a major challenge which systems designers and administrators strive to achieve. These systems are characterized as entities that operate in their own independent computing environments which are threatened by remote exploitation of vulnerabilities targeted on them. Our approach aims to assist in the reduction of such exploitations. We view distributed systems as sets of end-to-end computational environments that must be dynamically configured and audited prior to transaction execution. The industry lacks methods of trust assurance that utilize computing environment variables as the trust assurance credentials. 2. Business Processes Organization Security aspects of distributed systems may be viewed based on services that they provide services provided by those systems may be organized based on their security requirements. These requirements are layered into an organizational pyramid (Process Domain View and Security Requirements View) Fig.1. Figure 1. Distributed Processes Security Organization Reference Model Services may be categorized as anonymous, registered, encrypted, or audited processes. Each of these process layers is mapped according to security requirements/goals/attributes; anonymous processes require the functional availability and integrity attributes, while registered processes may require one or more of the functional authorization, authentication, identification, and non- repudiation attributes; on the Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises 978-0-7695-3315-5/08 $25.00 © 2008 IEEE DOI 10.1109/WETICE.2008.32 263 Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises 978-0-7695-3315-5/08 $25.00 © 2008 IEEE DOI 10.1109/WETICE.2008.32 263 Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises 978-0-7695-3315-5/08 $25.00 © 2008 IEEE DOI 10.1109/WETICE.2008.32 263 Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on April 21, 2009 at 17:38 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.