Nancy Bauer How to Do Things with Pornography. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015 (ISBN 978-0-674-05520-9) Lynne Tirrell Lynne Tirrell is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Boston, where she is affiliated with the Women's Studies Department. She currently chairs the American Philosophical Association's Committee on Public Philosophy. Tirrell's articles, on the politics of discourse, metaphor, hate speech, pornography, genocide, transitional justice, apology, forgiveness, feminist theory, and storytelling, have appeared in numerous journals, including The Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, Hypatia, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, and The New England Journal of Public Policy, plus many edited collections. Recent publications include "Genocidal Language Games," "Apologizing for Atrocity," "Transitional Justice in Rwanda," and "'Listen to What You Say': Rwanda's Post-Genocide Language Policies." The social, political, and philosophical project of Nancy Bauer's How to Do Things with Pornography transcends the topic of pornography, aiming to weigh in on "women's sexual experience, autonomy, and safety" (115), and offering advice on the importance of publicly engaged philosophy (147). Most important, perhaps, it sets out an alternative reading of Austin's landmark lectures: How to Do Things with Words (Austin 1975). Although five of its nine chapters do specifically address topics in women's sexuality, desire, identity, sexual objectification, and varieties of representations of these, the heart of the book is found in the three central chapters where Bauer discusses feminist uses and abuses of J. L. Austin. Bauer's bold views on "pornutopia," hookup culture, Lady Gaga, sexual objectification, and more are anchored in her interpretations of Austin, with nods to Cavell and Wittgenstein, so this will be my main focus. This is not to say that only the philosophy of language matters, but to say it matters a great deal, and if we can be clear about this, the rest will be much easier to apprehend. Readers looking for an attack on or defense of pornography will instead find a richly nuanced discussion that takes seriously real-life experiences and resists easy answers. This is a brave and insightful book, which philosophers, students, and interested nonacademics will find richly rewarding. A driving force in Bauer's book is her claim that Austin urges philosophers to be more aware of and attuned to the illocutionary force of our own speech. Bauer argues that our insularity in speaking to one another--the rest of the world be damned--renders moot what we say, stripping it of its content and robbing it of its force. Bauer says, "in failing to attend carefully to how real people actually speak, or what phenomena in the world (pornography, say) are actually like, what we say is at worst wrong and, at best, hollow" (105, see also 114--15). Bauer accuses philosophers of having "a robust lack of interest in what actual people's utterances mean in actual circumstances," which she deems tantamount to "a willingness to empty our own discourse of its illocutionary force and, therefore, of human weight" (106). She's right that philosophers need to look more carefully at the phenomena, but this doesn't settle the audience question. There remain