International Review of Law and Economics 30 (2010) 46–51 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect International Review of Law and Economics Homicide trials in Classical Athens Bryan C. McCannon Wake Forest University, Box 7505, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, United States article info Article history: Received 18 February 2009 Received in revised form 9 July 2009 Accepted 13 August 2009 JEL classification: K4 Keywords: Classical Athens Exile Homicide Jury decisionmaking Sanction abstract Homicide trials in Classical Athens had a unique feature. After the initial evidence was presented the defendant was given the option to go into a self-imposed exile for life losing all protections, rights, and wealth. If the defendant did not go into exile, then the trial continued with additional arguments presented. If the judges voted to convict, the sanction of death was imposed. Given the limited set of feasible sanctions available to the Athenians, it is argued that this institution is effective as it separates some guilty from the innocent. Consequently, fewer innocent are convicted and more guilty are punished. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction In Classical Athens homicide trials had an interesting and unique feature. As described by orator and speechwriter Demosthenes, “he [the defendant] is free to withdraw after making his first speech [to the judges], and neither prosecutor, nor the judges, nor any other man, has the authority to stop him” (23.69). This voluntary exile was a rather severe sanction since the individual lost all protection from the state, had his property confiscated, and could be killed (without punishment) if he returned to Athens. Exile, though, was less severe than the alternative of death, which was the prescribed sanction for intentional homicide. It is argued here that the institutional feature of allowing self- imposed exile in the interim stage of Athenian homicide trials, given the limited set of feasible sanctions, can be expected to improve upon the asymmetric information problem by separat- ing some of the guilty from the innocent. Adapting Bjerk’s (2007) model of the screening function of modern plea bargaining to ana- lyze this historical institution, it is shown that disproportionately more guilty accept the offer to self-impose exile. Hence, those who continue with the trial would more likely be innocent. This outcome is compared to the voluntary exile option not being available. It is shown that with the exile option available the judges would require a stronger signal of guilt to convict since the probability is small that the defendant who completes the trial is guilty. As a consequence, E-mail address: mccannbc@wfu.edu. the innocent are better off since fewer are convicted, while more of the guilty are punished. Therefore, under reasonable conditions, it can be argued that the institution used by the Classical Athenians is expected to be an effective institution for prosecuting homicide. A few have used economic analysis to analyze Classical Greeks institutions and decisionmaking. Fleck and Hanssen (2006) use a game-theoretic model of investment effort and the provision of democracy to improve upon the time-inconsistency problem. This is used to explain the rise and fall of democracy in Athens and the differing levels of democracy amongst the Greek city-states. Kaiser (2007) investigates the private provision of public goods in Classical Athens using a mechanism design approach. McCannon (2008) models Socrates’ trial where both the prosecutor and the defendant propose a sanction and the jury takes a simple majority vote over the two proposals. He derives a median-juror theo- rem and illustrates that such an institution has good properties. Bitros and Karayiannis (2008) discuss entrepreneurship, summa- rize Athenian economic activities, and provide a detailed summary of the literature on the Athenian economy. Karayiannis and Hatzis (2007) discuss the formal and informal institutional framework of Ancient Athenian legal system. They emphasize how social norms and moral behavior reduced transaction costs and how the legal system discovered solutions to economic problems. Farquharson (1969) and Riker (1986) study the Roman Pliny the Younger’s proposed voting procedures to illustrate the possibility of non- implementation of the Condorcet winner when there are three alternatives. There is a rich literature identifying and analyzing the imperfect information of defendant guilt in the modern legal system. Gay, 0144-8188/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2009.08.003