Chapter 15: The Control Arms Campaign. A Case Study for the NGO Impact on International Relations After the Cold War Javier Alcalde 1 1. Introduction Research in the field of international agreements on small arms and light weapons (hereafter SALW) has been focused mainly on specific aspects of the problem viewed from an international relations perspective, whereas the social movement dimension of the topic has been largely under- researched. Moreover, this research has been almost exclusively done by insiders, either activists or academics, closely connected to the NGO sector. Although they are arguably experts in the issue, this perspective may be biased towards overemphasizing the NGO role in these processes. On another front, most of works do not cover the most recent events. 2 This paper updates previous analysis, taking into account the events of 2006, while also contributing original empirical research from an outside perspective. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) is the global network of civil society organizations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms. Founded in 1998, IANSA has grown rapidly to include more than seven hundred member groups in over one hundred countries. It is composed of a wide range of organizations, including policy development organizations, national gun control groups, research institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, victims, human rights and community action organizations. Initiatives dealing with small arms have usually been implemented at local, national, and regional levels. More recent global actions on small arms represent a turning point in the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW adopted in July 2001 at the first UN Conference on SALW. Its review conference in the summer of 2006, however, ended without agreement. In 2003, IANSA joined OXFAM and Amnesty International in launching the international campaign Control Arms, which obtained its first positive result towards a future arms trade treaty through a resolution approved in October 2006 by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which deals with disarmament and international security issues. This situation offers a unique opportunity to study the impact of social movements on international relations, a field that has frequently faced analytical challenges. 3 In the cases examined here, one can argue that there was success in the latter (resolution in the UN General Assembly) but not the former (small arms revision conference) by a relatively clear and uncontested standard. When accounting for the two different outcomes, this text focuses on the change in the rules of the game from one setting to the next. As will be explained, the main argument affirms that institutional setting (voting rules, number of issues on the agenda, NGO access to the negotiations, etc.) affects 1 Previous versions of this text were presented at the ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 6-8 September 2007; and at the International Conference: The “Establishment” Responds: The Institutional and Social Impact of Protest Movements During and After the Cold War, Heidelberg, 22-27 November 2007. The comments and suggestions of all participants were very helpful. I especially thank Donatella della Porta, Jennifer L. Erickson, Martin Klimke, Lorenzo Mosca, Mario Pianta and Katherine Scott. All possible mistakes are only mine. 2 See e.g. Denise García, “Norm Building in the Evolution of the Control of Small Arms in the International Agenda”, Security and Defense Studies Review 5 2, (Autumn 2005). 3 See e.g. Marco Giugni and Lorenzo Bosi’s chapter in this volume “The Impact of Protest Movements on the Establishment: Dimensions, Models, Approaches”.