Medvedev Overplays the “Military Card” in Trying to Impress Obama by Dale Herspring and Roger N. McDermott Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Introduction In his March 17, 2009 speech to Russia’s top military brass, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev raised the specter of a strong and robust Russian military.[1 ] The fact is that while Russia is undergoing a major reform of its armed forces, and beginning to pump money into it, it will be several years, 2020 according to many Russian officers, before the Russian armed forces will be equipped with modern weapons. The reality is that the Russian military is in no position to threaten anyone. By their own admission, Russian generals view the war in Georgia as a “disaster.” Russia won, but only by using outdated weapons and equipment and the kind of frontal military attack that was more reminiscent of World War II, than of the modern (non-contact) type of warfare. In short, Medvedev’s effort to play the military card was nothing more than an effort to gain a diplomatic advantage by pulling the wool over the West’s eyes. Russia Launches Major Military Reform All indications are that Moscow has launched a major shake-up of its military establishment, quite unlike any previous attempts at reform since 1945. In fact, we would argue that if carried through to its completion, it will be the structural equivalent of the late Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov’s “revolution in military affairs.” Indeed, based on the direction it appears to be taking, the future Russian military could well be unrecognizable to those who have watched the evolution of the Soviet or the current Russian armed forces. Consider the changes underway at present. First, plans for personnel numbers: Much to the chagrin and in some cases opposition (by serving officers), the officer corps is being cut from 355,000 (there are 400,000 slots but only 355,000 are filled at present) to 150,000.[2 ] Following NATO’s example, Moscow has decided to cut the ratio of officers to enlisted from the current 2- 2.5 ratio to one for every fifteen enlisted personnel.[3 ] The numbers involved are staggering. For example, the number of generals on active duty will be cut from 1,107 to 886 (primarily in logistics since much of it will be civilianized), and colonels from 25,665 to 9,114. Majors will be cut from 99,550 to 25,000, while captains will go from 90,000 to 40,000. The only officer rank to gain will be lieutenants and they will go up by 10,000.[4 ] No sector is being spared. There are currently 140,000 warrant officers on active duty. By the end of 2009 all but 20,000 (primarily in the Navy) will be gone.[5 ] They will be given the option of becoming non-commissioned officers or—if they are currently filling an officer’s billet—they have the possibility of lateraling into the officer corps. Otherwise, they will be civilianized.