Landscape and Urban Planning, 20 ( 1991 ) 197-204 197 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam Regulations and incentives as solutions to the social dilemma in wetland management Gjalt Huppes ~and Cees J.H. Midden 2 ICentre for Environmental Studies, Leiden University. P.O. Box 9518. 2300 RA Leiden (The Netherlands) 2Social and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden (The Netherlands) (Accepted for publication 23 August 1990) ABSTRACT Huppes, G. and Midden, C.J.H., 1991. Regulations and incentives as solutions to the social dilemma in wetland manage- ment. Landscape Urban Plann., 20:197-204. Nature is threatened in almost all developed and developing countries in a variety of ways. Uncontrolled growth endan- gers our finite environment. Of course, governments look for policy instruments to inhibit this process. A wide range of instruments is available. These instruments can differ greatly in nature, scope, feasibility, and probably also in efficacy. The central question is how people react to these instruments. In this paper, a framework will be built with which some different approaches may be classified. However, which instruments should be preferred cannot be stated easily and often instruments can be combined. Of course situational factors limit the options. To make a good choice this common frame- work may be useful to integrate different strategies and it allows some predictions as to environmental efficacy, adminis- trative requirements, local income and other relevant effects. This paper is not directed at specific issues or localized problems in wetland preservation and development. We will examine policy instruments to stimulate wise use of resources and discuss the quality of wetlands. INTRODUCTION Basically the processes which threaten our environment, including our wetlands, are caused by a pervasive conflict between indi- vidual short-term interests of continued growth in terms of private spending power, on the one hand, and the collective good of a rich envi- ronment in the long-term, on the other. This phenomenon is called a social dilemma. One, more local, example of it has been described convincingly by Garret Hardin (1968) who analyzed the parable "the tragedy of the com- mons". The parable describes a situation in which a number of herdsmen graze their herds on a common range. Each herdsman is aware that it is to his benefit to increase the size of his herd as long as an additional animal repre- sents additional private profit to himself, while the costs of grazing the animal, in terms of the extra competition for the available grass, is shared by all of the herdsmen. Starting from an unspoiled situation each herdsman is moti- vated to increase his flock size. As this hap- pens the quality of the commons deteriorates by overgrazing, leading unavoidably to the col- lapse of the commons and the ultimate deci- mation or even annihilation of the herds that grazed on it. Hardin's parable illustrates how in a situation of interdependence reasonable individual choices lead to a collective disaster. The world resources of fossil energy, minerals and natural resources, of clean air, water and soil, and of nature itself are examples of where the social dilemma is apt to occur because peo- ple have unlimited access to a cheap, or even 0169-2046/91/$03.50 © 1991 -- Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.