Susan Mendus zyxw Teaching Morality in a Plural Society’ zy THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MORAL VALUES CAN OR SHOULD BE taught has caused controversy and divided opinion almost since the beginning of time, and certainly since the very earliest days of philosophy. As is well-known, Socrates was condemned to death on charges of impiety and of corrupting the minds of the Athenian youth. Although the latter accusation was never fully spelled out, it was certainly connected with the perceived moral subversiveness of his philosophy and, in particular, with his denial that those who purported to teach moral values were qualified to do any such thing. This denial was construed by many as dangerous and as an attack on the moral foundations of Athenian society for which, famously, Socrates paid a high price. Times change, but the belief that teachers should communicate society’s moral values to their pupils remains as strong as ever. Even if the price of refusal is not as high as it was for Socrates, it is still true that those who are reluctant to comply attract considerable odium. Thus, in recent years a number of writers on education have protested at what they see as teachers’ willingness to abdicate responsibility for moral education, and these writers have urged a conception of the teacher’s role which includes a responsibility to teach moral values. Moreover, they have interpreted any refusal to undertake this task as evidence of commitment to moral relativism, or as evincing the belief that moral judgment is no more than a matter of personal decision or preference. A few examples may serve to give the flavour of the allegations now made against teachers: The young have been taught.. zyxwv . that they should never think of the views of others as false, but only as different. They have been taught that to suggest that someone else is wrong is at best rude and at worst immoral: I Work on this paper was undertaken during a period of research leave which I spent in the Research School for Social Science at the Australian National University, Canberra. I am extremely grateful to members of the Philosophy Sector at ANU, all of whom were very generous to me both personally and intellectually. I am deeply indebted to them.