41 A Preliminary Sketch on Embodied Transcendental Subjectivity in Husserl Genki Uemura 1,2 1 Department of Philosophy and Ethics, Graduate School of Letters, Keio University 2 Centre for Advanced Research on Logic and Sensibility (CARLS), Keio University Introduction In §53 of Crisis (1936), Husserl formulates the so-called “paradox of subjectivity”: Universal intersubjectivity, into which all objectivity, everything that exists at all, is resolved, can obviously be nothing other than mankind; and the latter is undeniably a component part of the world. How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world [...]? (VI, 183, my emphasis) 1 While the consequence drawn here—“human beings are subjects for the world [...] and at the same time are objects in this world” (VI, 184)—sounds paradoxical, one of its premises, which Husserl considers to be obvious, is in fact not that obvi- ous: transcendental (inter-)subjectivity 2 is identical to humans, i.e. rational and finite individuals with their body in the world. In other words, the premise is that transcendental subjectivity is embodied in humans without loosing its constituting function. In the first quotation above Husserl does not give any reason about that, but he should do it. For even Husserl himself does not always hold the claim in question. In a manuscript of 1908 he writes: 1 . I refer to volumes of Husserl [1950ff. and 2001ff.] by indicating their number in roman numerals. 2 . In this paper I ignore the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity. 339