The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won’t Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It Seth E. Masket, University of Denver Jonathan Winburn, University of Mississippi Gerald C. Wright, Indiana University ABSTRACT Redistricting received substantial attention in the popular media in 2011, as states redrew state legislative and congressional district boundaries. Many reformers con- tinue to argue for a de-politicization of the redistricting process, claiming that partisan redistricting is responsible for declining electoral competition and increasing legislative polarization. Our analysis of evidence from state legislatures during the last decade sug- gests that the effects of partisan redistricting on competition and polarization are small, considerably more nuanced than reformers would suggest, and overwhelmed by other aspects of the political environment. O ne of the most important legacies of the 2010 elec- tion cycle will be its effect on legislative redistrict- ing. In many states, shifts in control of the state legislature or the governor’s office have led to changes in who draws the legislative maps for the next decade. How these maps are drawn could potentially swing partisan control of several state legislatures and could also affect control of the US Congress. Indeed, a few state legislators redraw- ing a few lines could make all the difference in determining which party controls the House of Representatives in the coming years. Many of the arguments from political observers, however, focus less on partisan control of chambers and more on issues of polar- ization, competition, and basic fairness. The leader of Common Cause Minnesota, for example, has recently argued for redistrict- ing reform on the grounds that the current system “moves parties farther to the left and to the right.... That polarization is really what has made our politics broken” (Brown 2011). Such arguments recur every 10 years without fail. However, as we demonstrate in this article, claims that partisan redistricting, or “gerrymandering,” leads to declining competition and increasing polarization are unfounded. That redistricting can significantly affect election out- comes has been demonstrated elsewhere, and we do not investi- gate this phenomenon or its normative implications here.We focus on examining redistricting’s effect on polarization and competi- tiveness, which, as it turns out, ranges from marginal to undetect- able. Furthermore, as we show, the outcomes of redistricting, in terms of polarization and competitiveness, tend to be identical regardless of who is drawing the maps, which suggests that issues of fairness or inappropriateness are largely irrelevant. POPULAR BELIEFS ABOUT REDISTRICTING In November 2005, California’s voters rejected an initiative that would have taken the task of redrawing the state’s legislative dis- tricts away from the state legislature and placed it in the hands of a nonpartisan commission. (The state would adopt a similar ini- tiative three years later.) The Los Angeles Times endorsed the initiative in strong language, explaining the problem with the districts as drawn up by the state legislature in 2001 as follows: Seth E. Masket is associate professor of political science at the University of Denver. He is the author of No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures (University of Michigan Press, 2009). He can be reached at smasket@du.edu. Jonathan Winburn is assistant professor of political science at the University of Missis- sippi. He is the author of The Realities of Redistricting: Following the Rules and Lim- iting Gerrymandering in State Legislative Redistricting (Lexington, 2008). He can be reached at jwinburn@olemiss.edu. Gerald C. Wright is a professor of political science at Indiana University, Bloomington. He is a co-author of Statehouse Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and numerous articles on elections and representation. He can be reached at wright1@indiana.edu. ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. FEATURES ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. doi:10.1017/S1049096511001703 PS • January 2012 39