My Memorable Experiences as a Marketing Academic at the Federal Trade Commission William L. Wilkie The Background1 I was fortunate to be the first marketing academic to be able to go in-house as a consultant to the Federal Trade Commis sion’s (FTC’s) Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) in June 1972. As I will relate, it was a memorable experience involving a host of activities, one of which was to help start a new FTC Marketing Academic Consultancy program, “Project MAC.” During the ensuing ten years, some 30 marketing academics participated in this program, with considerable impact on both FTC operations and marketing academic thought itself. The program was briefly revived in the early 1990s, giving several more academics the oppor tunity to move in-house as well. The impetus for marketing academics to join the staff of the FTC can be traced to a sharp change in the political con text enveloping the agency in the late 1960s. In accord with general societal unrest accompanying the unpopular war in Vietnam, there was increased questioning of both big busi ness and big government institutions. In addition, there was an impetus for more active regulation of marketers, which originated from a diverse set of institutions and represented a strong set of forces. Prominently, a report by the “Nader’s Raiders” consumerist group harshly criticized the FTC’s low profile during the 1960s (Cox, Fellmeth, and Shultz 1969). Among its allegations, the group pointed out that at this point the FTC was issuing fewer than 70 complaints a year against deceptive promotional practices in the entire country. Cast against the massive promotional activity of the American economy, it was obvious that the chance of detection and prosecution was extremely slim (Pitofsky 1977). President Richard Nixon then requested the presti gious American Bar Association (ABA) to appoint a blue- ribbon task force to investigate these charges.2 Its detailed report (ABA 1969) provided findings similar to those of ^ee also the Wilkie and Murphy (2013) article in Journal of Historical Research in Marketing, on which portions of this essay are based. 2I cannot be sure of the extent to which personal relationships might have influenced this development. However, this action was unexpected from President Nixon, a Republican who had been elected with strong support from a business community that did not particularly favor an active FTC. Speculation abounded that he had been lobbied by none other than Harvard Law student Edward Cox, the senior author of the Nader Report. Cox was dating Nixon’s daughter Tricia at the time, and they were married in 1971. William L. Wilkie is Nathe Professor of Marketing, University of Notre Dame (e-mail: wwilkie@nd.edu). Nader’s group, concluding that drastic changes within the agency were needed. If such changes were not made, more over, the ABA report called for disbanding the entire FTC and assigning its tasks to other agencies. President Nixon and Congress decided to support these changes. The head of the ABA Report, Miles Kirkpatrick, was named FTC Chair man, new appointments were made inside the agency, and the agency’s budget was increased substantially.3 During the following decade, the FTC emphasized new powers and programs. Advertising was a major target: new proposals were advanced on topics such as advertising sub stantiation (Cohen 1980), corrective advertising (Wilkie, McNeill, and Mazis 1984), comparative advertising (Wilkie and Farris 1975), affirmative disclosure (Wilkie 1982), advertising to children (Mazis 1979; Ratner 1978), and advertising code barriers (e.g., opening more advertising in such areas as eyeglasses, drugs, and other professions). The net effect during the 1970s was to create a much more pow erful regulatory agency, supported by a 500% budget increase throughout the decade (Murphy and Wilkie 1990). However, this increase in power and activity sparked a strong backlash from the business community, and the 1980s were marked by restrictions on FTC powers in several regulatory areas (a development I discuss subsequently). The Search for Marketing Academics at the FTC President Nixon’s decision to increase the scope and level of the FTC’s marketing regulatory activity brought to con sciousness the FTC’s possible need for additional expertise. In particular, Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones was active in advancing this view. She confronted some resis tance from those with legal backgrounds, who were com fortable working with other attorneys and still gaining experience working with the different thinking advanced by economists. However, Commissioner Jones persisted, and she decided to begin the process by adding to her own small staff of advisors (Jones 1990). In 1970, she contacted George S. Day, then an assistant professor of marketing at Stanford University, about his willingness to serve as an in- house consultant. Day was unavailable but recommended his recent doctoral student, Murray Silverman (currently on faculty at San Francisco State University), who took the ini tial position as an advisor to Commissioner Jones. 3Freer (1971) presents an interesting summary of early important changes. © 2014, American Marketing Association ISSN: 0743-9156 (print), 1547-7207 (electronic) 194 Journal of Public Policy & Marketing Vol. 33 (2) Fail 2014, 194-201