–1– SUBMITTED ARTICLE Evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy of emotion Fabrice Teroni, Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Switzerland Correspondence Fabrice Teroni, University of Geneva, Department of Philosophy, 5 rue de Candolle, 1211 Genève 4, Switzerland Email: Fabrice.Teroni@unige.ch In contemporary psychology and philosophy, influential theories approach the emotions via their relations to values and evaluations. My aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy relate to one another. I first explain why this presupposes that we make up our minds about the relations between “molecular” and “molar” properties. The rest of my discussion explores some ways of understanding the relation between the molar and the molecular: as a relation of epistemological support, of identity or of the determinable-determinates type. KEYWORDS emotion, philosophy of emotion, psychology of emotions, evaluative theories of emotions, appraisal theory, molecular and molar appraisals 1. INTRODUCTION The starting point of this paper is a puzzlement about the best way to understand the relation between influential theories that have concurrently emerged in psychology and philosophy of emotion. These are the theories that give pride of place to values and evaluations (or “appraisals”, as psychologists prefer to say)— evaluative theories, for short. According to evaluative theories, the essential entry point into the nature of sadness and pride, for example, is the way sadness relates to (evaluation in terms of) loss and the way pride relates to (evaluation in terms of) success. These theories are attractive, as well as common—if not leading—currency in psychology and in philosophy. However, despite this convergence, the relation