11. Principles of Pragmatics After the formal definition of LA-grammar as a syntactic rule system in Part II, we return now to the topic briefly touched upon in Section 2.2 and Chapter 5, namely the functioning of natural language in communication. A theory of communication is especially important for our theory of grammar, because we explain the structure of natural language solely by the function of the signs in communication, and without any recourse to structures which are supposed to be "innate" and/or "universal." Describing the structure of natural-language signs, and explaining how these signs are used to transmit information, are different tasks. But there is clearly a connection between these two aspects of analysis, because the structure of the sign must be suitable for use, and the functioning of the use must be explained in part by the structure of the sign. The general theory of pragmatics (or language use) developed in the present chapter is based on the assumption that the central task of pragmatics is the correct positioning of the sign relative to the interpretation context. The primary fix-point of this positioning procedure is the Space-Time-Agent-Recipient point of origin of the sign, or STAR-point for short. A secondary positioning is based on the linear structure of natural-language signs. Section 11.1 gives a conceptual analysis of the reference mechanisms underlying the use of symbols, icons, and indices. Section 11.2 presents the First Principle of Pragmatics, and explains how the theory of literal meaning and its use differs from the theory of Grice. Section 11.3 uses a postcard to illustrate the principles of reference by examining of the correct positioning of each word in relation to the interpretation context. Section 11.4 applies this theory of pragmatics to different types of signs. Section 11.5, finally, explains the principles of non-literal use. 11.1 Peirce and the Theory of Signs The most basic topic of a theory of communication is the structure of the different kinds of signs. Building on concepts pioneered by Charles S. Peirce (1839 - 1814), 1 we can distinguish four kinds of referring objects, namely symbols, icons, indices, and pictures. Of these, only symbols, icons, and indices are "signs." Furthermore, only symbols, icons, and pictures are "representations." In other words, indices are signs without being representations, pictures are representations without being signs, ("The research begun by Peirce has not been followed up and this is a great pity. A better under- standing of the complex processes of meaning in language...could be expected...from progress in the analysis of symbols." Beneviste (1971), p. II. R. Hausser, Computation of Language © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989