Contemporary Pragmatism Editions Rodopi Vol. 8, No. 1 (June 2011), 153–171 © 2011 A Reconstruction of Freedom in the Age of Neuroscience: A View from Neuropragmatism Tibor Solymosi Pragmatism has resurged explicitly in neopragmatism and implicitly in neurophilosophy. Neopragmatists have focused primarily on ideals, like human freedom, but at the expense of science. Neuro- philosophers have focused primarily on scientific facts, but with an eye toward dismissing aspects of our self-conception like free will as illusory. In both cases, these resurgences are impoverished as each neglects what Dewey referred to as the method of intelligence. Neurophilosophical pragmatism – neuropragmatism – aims to over- come the deficiencies of neopragmatism and neurophilosophy by carrying forth the project of reconstruction by taking both the methods and results of experimental inquiry as the means for attaining ends-in-view such as human freedom. Reconstruction is in the air. While working on this particular essay and its larger project, I was quite pleased to see Philip Kitcher’s recent piece 1 inspired by John Dewey’s book, Reconstruction in Philosophy. 2 Such clarion calls about the present and future state of philosophy often connect to Dewey. Such a call is particularly pressing in light of the enthusiasm and hype over the advances and promises of the neurosciences. Neuro-enthusiasts address the questions of everyday people that Kitcher argues professional philosophers have neglected. This philosophical work is being done often by those untrained in philosophy. Pragmatists should be concerning themselves with the consequences of neuroscience. I assert this for the following two reasons (which are by no means the only two). First, the advances that the neurosciences provide in our understanding of how we humans work reinforce and elucidate the conclusions of classical pragmatists. Second, these advances offer both solutions or the tools to effect solutions to human problems as well as new problems in need of philosophical attention. These problems range from the big questions, like what it means to be human, to more specific philosophical ones like free will, to concrete policy questions about the just treatment of convicted criminals. That philosophers, especially pragmatists, have a responsibility in this situation to be both liaison officers between special disciplines as well as critics of a burgeoning neuro-culture should be of little doubt. 3 As Kitcher argues, the