China's InternationalRelations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process David Shambaugh ABSTRACT Over the past two decades China's international relations (IR) think tanks have come to play increasinglyimportant roles in China's foreign policy making and intelligence analysis, as well as serving as an increasingly important liaison to officials and specialists in foreign countries. During this period China's IR thinktanks have expanded in quantity as well as improving the quality of personnel and analytical product. Publications by, and discussions with, these thinktanks often offer important indicationsof broader policy debates and competitionamong institutesand their staff. This article surveys the current organization and state of research in China's IR think tanks, offers historical perspectives on the evolution of this community, and provides current information of relevance to those who interactwith these institutionsand read their publications. In 1987 I published a survey of China's international relations (IR) institutes (think tanks) in this journal, basedon my interaction with these institutes during 1983-85.' At thattime many of these analytical organs were just being established or were rebuilding after being closed during the Cultural Revolution. Some things have changed in the interim, while othershave not. The community of IR institutes/think tanks has certainlyexpanded over time - as China increasingly interacts with the outside world, as Chinese leaders have a greater needfor better intelligence and knowledge aboutworld affairs, as the academic discipline of international relations has developed,2 and as increasedfinancialresourceshave been made available (including funding from the private sector in China and from American philanthropic foundations). Ministerial-level officials also in- creasingly turn to their affiliatedthink tanks for policy researchand advice. As Bonnie Glaser and Philip Saunders' contribution to this symposium elucidates, the "policy influence" of these think tanks is difficult to assess andthe indicators aredifficult to measure, but undoubt- edly the decision-making system has become more consultativeover 1. David Shambaugh, "China's national security research bureaucracy," The China Quarterly, No. 110 (June1987),pp. 276-304. 2. In the growing study of the study of IR in China see Yuan Ming (ed.), Kua shiji de tiaozhan: Zhongguo guojiguanxi xueke de fazhan (TheTrans-Century Challenge: China's International Relations Scholarship and Development) (Chongqing: Chongqing renmin chubanshe, 1993); Gerald Chan, "International studies in China: origins and development," Issues and Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 (February 1997),pp. 40-64; Gerald Chan, "Toward an international relations theory withChinese characteristics?" IssuesandStudies, Vol. 34, No. 6 (June1998),pp. 1-28; Gerald Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); and Ren Xiao, The International Relations Theoretical Discourse in China: A Preliminary Analysis (Washing- ton, DC: George Washington University Sigur Center for Asian Studies Asia Paper No. 9, 2000).For anearlier assessment see David Shambaugh and Wang Jisi,"Research and training in international studies in the People'sRepublic of China," PS, Vol. 17 No. 4 (Fall 1984), pp. 6-14. ? The China Quarterly, 2002 This content downloaded from 128.164.150.96 on Fri, 19 Jul 2013 13:14:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions