Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002) 217-233 THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM Summary Josep E. CORBf University of Valencia, Spain Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical frame- work Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Al- though I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently elaborated a new collaborative paper entitled 'Nondescliptivist Cognitivism. Frame- work for a New Metaethics', where they vindicate the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In some of their preceding collaborative papers, Horgan and Timmons had al- ready developed a number of arguments to challenge a few current at- tempts to buttress descliptivism and the corresponding metaphysical stance, namely: moral realism. They have mainly challenged Brink's and Boyd's attempt to treat moral terms as functional, that is, as terms that designate functional properties. Although, in 'Troubles for Mi- chael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism', they also object to Michael Smith's interpretation of the claim that normative reasons require the convergence "in the desires of fully rational agents." 1 1. Smith (1994), p. 173.